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THE TORT OF BETRAYAL OF TRUST
Caroline Forell*
Anna Sortun**
Fiduciary betrayal is a serious harm. Wen the fiduciary is a doctor or a lawyer,
and the entrustor is a patient or client, this harm frequently goes unremedied. Be-
trayals arise out of disloyalty and conflicts of interest where the lawyer or doctor
puts his or her interest above that of his or her client or patient. They cause digni-
tary harm that is different from the harm flowing from negligent malpractice.
Nevertheless, courts, concerned with overdeterrence, have for the most part refused
to allow a separate claim for betrayal. In this Article, we suggest that betrayal de-
serves a remedy and propose a new statutory tort with limits on the available
money damages. We begin by explaining the importance of trust and the inade-
quacy of common law remedies such as malpractice, lack of informed consent, and
breach of fiduciary duty. We then set out a statutorily limited monetary proposal
and illustrate how this remedy would work. We do this by examining a series of
cases in which the courts have struggled to address betrayals and then applying
our statutory tort to the facts of those cases. Our proposed statutory tort offers a so-
lution to the current failure to hold professionals accountable for disloyalty that
will provide justice to those who are injured by exploitive self-dealing while setting
clear parameters that address judicial concerns of runaway juries and overlap
with other tort claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
An attorney, after intentionally misrepresenting his fertility, has
sexual relations with his divorce client who suffers an ectopic
pregnancy and ends up sterile.' A doctor refuses to refer a patient
to a cardiac specialist because of financial pressure from an HMO,
and the patient later dies of a heart attack. A psychiatrist has an
affair with his patient's wife, causing his patient to suffer long-term
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I. Barbara A. v.John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
2. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Il1.
2000).
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emotional distress. A criminal lawyer's conflict of interest creates
the likelihood that his client receives a criminal punishment that
he would not have received without the lawyer's disloyalty.4 A
surgeon substantially overstates how much experience he has in
the kind of surgery that he performs on a patient who ends up a
quadriplegic. 5
In each of these fact patterns, either a physician or attorney be-
trays the trust of another in the context of a fiduciary relationship,
causing dignitary as well as physical or severe emotional harm. The
professional misconduct in the above scenarios, where conflicts of
interest are apparent, differs from purely competence-based pro-
fessional malpractice claims. In these situations, harm arises from
the fiduciary's disloyalty-putting his or her personal interests
ahead of the interests of another person for whom a special re-
sponsibility exists, thereby betraying fiduciary trust.6
Trust and loyalty involving doctors and lawyers has been a hot
topic among legal scholars.7 In particular, the influence of law on
trust in medicine has been the recent focus of a number of legal
commentators.8 The medical profession's own scrutiny of the ubiq-
uitous financial relationships between doctors and pharmaceutical
companies and medical device manufacturers has also raised con-
3. Mazza v. Huffacker, 300 S.E.2d 833, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). See also Torgeson v.
Connor, 738 P.2d 994 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (physician having a secret affair with patient's wife
performed a vasectomy on the patient).
4. In reJeffrey, 898 P.2d 752 (Or. 1995).
5. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of NJ., 800 A.2d 73, 76, 77 (NJ. 2002) (using
lack of informed consent based on affirmative misrepresentation of surgical experience
instead of relying on breach of fiduciary duty);Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis.
1996) (same).
6. Professor Deborah A. DeMott suggests defining fiduciary duty claims in terms of
"whether the plaintiff (or claimed beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) would be justified in ex-
pecting loyal conduct on the part of an actor and whether the actor's conduct contravened
that expectation." Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of
Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 925, 936 (2006). This definition of fiduciary
duty is particularly well-suited for betrayal of trust claims, as discussed more fully below.
7. See, e.g., Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foun-
dations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735 (2001); Carl Schneider, Family Law in the Age
of Distrust, 33 FAM. L. Q. 447 (1999); Lisa Fairfax, Trust, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Lessons from Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025 (2002); Eileen Scallen, Promises Broken
vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 897
(1993); Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553 (2001).
8. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 919 (2002); Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Cae: Fostering Trust in Medicine
Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 395 (2004); Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in
Human Subjects Research: The Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J.
327 (2003); Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463 (2002).
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cerns about betrayals.9 However, where a medical doctor receives a
kickback or a substantial economic benefit from a drug company10
or has a substantial financial investment in a company that manu-
factures a device the doctor says the patient needs, law has
struggled with how to respond.
We wade into this conversation by demonstrating that betrayal of
fiduciary trust by doctors and lawyers is a serious dignitary harm
that deserves a legal remedy of its own. The remedy we propose is a
statutory tort. Recovery under our statutory scheme would be solely
for the dignitary harm stemming from the betrayal and would be
separate from existing common law remedies. Entrustors could
bring such a claim against doctors, lawyers and, if the legislature
chose, other professionals in analogous trust relationships, such as
clergy'12 or psychologists,'3 for exploitive self-dealing. Our proposed
limited remedy would provide monetary relief in addition to
proven damages stemming from such common law claims as mal-
practice, lack of informed consent, misrepresentation, or battery.
Furthermore, for egregious betrayals, plaintiffs who cannot make
out a currently recognized common law claim could still recover
under our statutory tort as a stand-alone claim.
Because financial loss is already an accepted basis for a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against professionals,14 our statutory tort pro-
posal focuses instead on the numerous situations where the
professional's betrayal is either the only harm, or accompanies
other injuries that are themselves compensable at common law.
To date, most appellate courts that have addressed whether to al-
low a claim for betrayal of trust in such settings (typically framed as
9. See Dr. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Inter-
est, 295J. AM. MED. Assoc. 429 (2006). See also Duff Wilson, Harvard Medical School in Ethics
Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2009, at B1.
10. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
11. Reed Abelson, Financial Ties Are Cited as Issue in Spine Study, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2008, at Al.
12. Clergy and other religious advisors are professionals for whom the tort of betrayal
is obviously apt. We do not include an in-depth analysis of clergy and parishioner cases here.
It is the one area where the claim of breach of fiduciary duty has occasionally been success-
ful. Legislatures adopting our proposed statutory tort could easily extend its remedy to apply
to clergy. However, if breach of fiduciary duty claims are being permitted, the statutory tort
might be redundant. It would also likely face claims of interference with the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Jeffery R. Anderson et al., The First Amendment:
Churches Seeking Sanctuary for the Sins of the Fathers, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617 (2004).
13. Corgan v. Mueling, 522 N.E.2d 153 (I1. App. 1988) (psychologist breached fiduci-
ary duty by having sex with patient).
14. See George Chamberlain, Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Undue Influ-
ence By Attorney in Self-Dealing with Client, 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 1 (1991) (providing a
practical outline of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against attorney that focuses solely
on economic loss).
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a breach of fiduciary duty claim) have refused to do so. 5 Further-
more, the few appellate cases providing remedies for fiduciary
betrayal have varied widely in their descriptions of the kind of legal
remedy allowed. In this Article, we urge that state legislatures step
in where most courts have refused to go. We propose that legisla-
tures provide a monetary remedy with specific dollar limits for
dignitary injury resulting from betrayal of fiduciary trust by attor-
neys and physicians.' 6 This statutory tort would cover situations
where the only provable harm was the betrayal itself, as well as
situations where there is both a fiduciary's betrayal and physical or
severe emotional harm for which a common law claim would be
available.
A statutory tort remedy is necessary for the betrayal itself. Even
where the professional performs competently and provides a bene-
ficial service, as in the leading case of Moore v. Regents of the
University of Calfornia17 discussed in detail later in this Article,'8 if
the betrayal of trust is proved intentional or reckless, the betrayal
deserves a tort remedy. Thus, if an attorney competently represents
a client while betraying her by demanding sexual favors in ex-
15. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570
N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. Minn. 1997); see also Azza Jayaprakash, Sum of Your Parts: Are There
Adequate Remedies for Victims of Fraudulent Tissue & Organ Acquisition ? 9 DE PAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 1235 (2006).
Alan Milstein, the attorney who settled the highly publicized suit against the University of
Pennsylvania on behalf of Jesse Gelsinger, the 18-year-old who died during a gene-therapy
experiment, has unsuccessfully sued other clinical researchers for various torts including the
novel claim of "breach of the right to be treated with dignity." For additional information
about Alan Milstein and the Gelsinger case, see http://www.sskrplaw.com/attorneys/
milstein/ (Attorney biography for Alan S. Milstein) (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) and
http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/gelsinger.html (compilation of internet links related to the
Gelsinger litigation) (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). See also TracyJohnson, Jury Sides with Hutch,
Doctors in Deaths of 5-Patients Knew Risks in Leukemia Treatment Study, Panel Decides, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, April 9, 2004, at Al.
16. This remedy could be extended to other fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationships
such as clergy and psychologists. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. For example,
the Canadian Supreme Court has held that parents and stepparents can be found liable for
breach of fiduciary duty in cases involving incest. See M.(K) v. M.(H.), 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289
(Can. 1992). This decision has been widely followed in Canada in cases involving incest. See
Margaret Isabel Hall, "Intuitive Fiduciaries": The Equitable Structure of Family Life, 19 CAN. FAM.
L. 345, 356 n.33 (listing cases where incest victim has brought claim of breach of fiduciary
duty); see also Norberg v. Wynrib, 1992 Carswell B.C. 155 (McLachlin, J.) (finding doctor's
sex-for-drugs relationship with patient was a breach of fiduciary duty).
17. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (competent and necessary removal of spleen with secret
plans to use patient's cells for profit). See also Rice v. Perl (Perl I), 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn.
1982) (competent settlement of torts case where attorney's employee also worked for the
opposing party); Pierce v. Cook, No. 2006-CP-01842-SCT, 2008 WL 3500426, at 99 10-12
(Miss. Aug. 14, 2008) (holding that having an affair with a client's wife did not prevent com-
petent representation in medical malpractice case but did amount to betrayal of trust).
18. See infra Part IV.A.I.
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change, a remedy for the betrayal should be available. 9 In the
medical setting, if a doctor accepts kickbacks in exchange for pre-
scribing a particular drug, and that kickback is contrary to ethical
or regulatory limits imposed by the government or the American
Medical Association, there should be a monetary remedy regard-
less of whether physical or economic harm results from this
prescription.0 Similarly, if a doctor invests in the manufacture of a
medical device, such as an artificial spinal disk used in back sur-
gery, patients should have a monetary remedy against their
doctor/investor where regulatory agencies view the use of the de-
vice as medically unnecessary. 2' Too often courts misdescribe such
cases as malpractice, misrepresentation, or lack of informed con-
sent.
Betrayal of trust inflicts a dignitary harm. This harm is analogous
to other dignitary harms such as the interference with bodily integ-
rity, which is remedied by actions for assault, offensive battery, and
false imprisonment; harm to one's reputation which is remedied by
actions for slander and libel; and invasion of privacy which is reme-
died by various privacy claims.2 For all of these claims, there are at
least some situations where no injury beyond the dignitary inter-
ference itself is necessary for recovery. Similarly, we propose that,
when betrayal by a fiduciary is established, limited damages for dig-
nitary harm be recoverable without proof of any other harm. If a
professional betrays the trust of a patient or client, the law should
treat the betrayal as a separate and compensable dignitary injury.
We also propose that if an entrustor proves betrayal
accompanied by physical or severe emotional harms such as those
described at the beginning of this Article, the limited damages for
the dignitary harm should be allowed in addition to any damages
based on common law claims such as malpractice. Thus, an
attorney's sexual relationship with a client might result in liability
for incompetent representation as well as for violation of the
client's trust. In the medical context, a doctor might be held
accountable for actively concealing medical negligence from his or
her patient as well as for the malpractice itself.2 3 As these examples
19. See, e.g., In re Wood, 358 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1976) (disbarring attorney for repeatedly
bartering legal services for sexual favors).
20. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Bennedict Carey & Janet Roberts, Psychiatrists, Troubled
Children and Drug Industrys Role, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2007, at Al.
21. See Abelson, supra note 11; see generallyJerome Groopman, M.D., How Doctors Think
223-33 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2007).
22. See generaUy DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1197-1211 (2000).
23. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Physicians, 55
U. PiTr. L. REV. 291, 352-353 (1994) ("In the largest grouping of cases, courts have noted
the fiducial character of the relationship when considering whether the malpractice statute
SPRING 2009]
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show, the harm covered by a malpractice claim will differ from the
harm upon which a betrayal of trust claim is based, and the
betrayal of trust claim will represent an independent ground for
recovery.
These varied scenarios involving betrayals by professionals who
hold themselves out as healers or counselors demonstrate that fi-
duciary loyalty should be more widely and consistently recognized
as a separate, legally protected dignitary interest. Money damages
for betrayal of trust in these situations are justified for compensa-
tory, corrective justice, therapeutic, symbolic, prophylactic, and
punitive purposes. The legislature can address legitimate concerns
about over-deterrence and excessive punishment by placing spe-
cific dollar limits on the amount of damages recoverable, similar to
the limits many states place on torts claims against the govern-
ment.
2 4
In Part II, below, we begin by discussing the importance of trust
and the appropriateness of and need for a statutory claim to rem-
edy breaches of trust. Part II then explores the injuries that
accompany many betrayals and explains how existing legal reme-
dies often leave victims of betrayal without recourse. Next, in Part
III, we set out the parameters of our proposed statutory tort, in-
cluding a draft statute. Finally, in Part IV we demonstrate, through
of limitations should be tolled by a physician's 'fraudulent concealment' of her patient's
negligently induced injury.").
A related example involving both malpractice and betrayal is mentioned in an American
Medical News article about the power of apology under the insensitive heading "Timing is
Everything." See Andis Robeznieks, The Power of an Apology: Patients Appreciate Open Communi-
cation, AM. MED. NEWS, July 18, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2003/07/28/prsaO728.htm. The author describes a situation where an apology after a cover-
up did not suffice. Id. Due to medical negligence, a man's wife died during childbirth. Id.
However, the husband only discovered that a physician's mistake caused his wife's death
because he had doctor-friends who followed up with the hospital until it finally admitted the
error. Id. The man sued, noting that an admission and apology would most likely have suf-
ficed: "It would have been easier to forgive. But the first thing they did was treat me with
disrespect, and lie and cover up." Id.
This is an example of more than just bad timing. In addition to the original fatal malprac-
tice, the doctor and hospital were disloyal and betrayed the trust of the deceased patient's
spouse by refusing to admit that medical negligence was the cause of his wife's death. An
immediate admission and apology would have certainly avoided the betrayal and may also
have avoided the malpractice lawsuit. This is an ideal case for allowing both malpractice
damages and the limited betrayal damages we propose. The betrayal damages would send a
clear message that disloyalty is not just bad timing and demonstrate that honesty and trust-
worthiness make economic sense.
See also Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis Into Evidence Policy
Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221, 258-259 (1999) (most doctors do not
inform patients of medical errors).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 2007); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.270 (2004)
(both set out specific dollar limits on tort recoveries against the state and its officers, em-
ployees or agents).
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an examination of cases involving doctors and lawyers who have
breached fiduciary trust, how the proposed statutory remedy would
provide justice and bring increased uniformity to the inconsistent
findings of state courts.
II. THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY TORT
Trust is an essential aspect of the professional relationships of
doctors and lawyers, both of whom have fiduciary relationships
with those they treat or counsel. Regarding medicine and trust,
Professor Mark Hall notes that "trust is the core, defining charac-
teristic of the doctor-patient relationship-the 'glue' that holds the
relationship together and makes it possible. '2' Similarly, trust lies at
the core of attorney-client relationships. As the Minnesota Su-
preme Court observes: "The law treats a client's right to an
attorney's loyalty as a kind of 'absolute' right .... This section
describes the relationship between trust and fiduciary duty, and
examines how a statutory remedy would fit in the current frame-
work of legal and non-legal remedies for harms that attorneys and
physicians, in their roles as fiduciaries, inflict on their clients and
patients.
A. Betrayal of Trust Inflicts Real Injury
Section II.A begins by explaining why trust is so critical to the re-
lationship between certain professionals and their clients and
patients. We then build on this well-accepted premise to suggest
that, even if an entrustor does not suffer financial harm, betrayal of
trust nevertheless can severely damage both the professional rela-
tionship and the entrustor.
25. Hall, supra note 8, at 470. See also Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business
Wen It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. Rv. 423, 426 (2001) ("Trust has always been
deemed a critical component of the therapeutic relationship.")
26. Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (Perl II), 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. 1984).
See also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (arguing that both doctors and lawyers have similar duties of loy-
alty akin to a unilateral personal friendship for a limited purpose).
27. Tamar Frankel coined this term to describe the person who gives power to, and is
dependent on the discretion of, the fiduciary. Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 800-01
(1983).
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1. Why Trust Matters
Fiduciary duty is consistently described as the most demanding
duty the law recognizes. The requirement of loyalty is what makes
it so demanding. Originating in equity as part of the law of trusts,
the stringent standard in a fiduciary relationship flows in one di-
rection from the fiduciary to the entrustor. A fiduciary typically
owes undivided loyalty to his or her entrustor. This is because, for a
specific limited purpose, the entrustor places trust in and is de-
pendent upon the fiduciary, who exercises discretion affecting the
entrustor.2 9 This builds a power imbalance, and an inherent risk of
abuse, into the fiduciary relationship. Professor Deborah DeMott
describes fiduciary relationships as relationships in which the "de-
termining criterion" is "whether the plaintiff (or claimed
beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) would be justified in expecting
loyal conduct on the part of an actor."' Clearly, the doctor-patient
and attorney-client relationships fit this definition.
Much has been written about the fiduciary duty. Most scholar-
ship has addressed divided loyalties of trustees and money
managers that result in financial harms.3 ' Nevertheless, when ad-
dressing breach of fiduciary duty, even in the typical context of
business and financial loss, the language of morality and obligation
rather than of the marketplace dominates. Betrayal of trust, self-
dealing, disloyalty, abuse of power, and conflict of interest are the
terms used to describe breaches of fiduciary duty. As Justice
Cardozo observed in an oft-quoted passage from Meinhard v.
Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties [who are] held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior .... Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude
28. Enders v. Parker, 66 P.3d 11, 16 (Alaska 2003); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168,
172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. a (1979).
30. DeMott, supra note 6, at 936.
31. Two particularly influential articles are Frankel's Fiduciary Law, supra note 27, and
Deborah A. DeMott's Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L. J.
879. See also Mark Blair Barta, Is the Imposition of Fiduciary Responsibilities Running from Manag-
ers, Directors and Majority Shareholders to Minority Shareholders Economically Efficient?, 38 CLEv.
ST. L. REv. 559 (1990); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.
L. REv. 595 (1997); Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits
of Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 51 (2000).
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of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty.... Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
32the crowd .
Fiduciary duty is often described as involving both due care and
undivided loyalty.33 For professionals who have fiduciary relation-
ships, such as doctors and lawyers, the due care aspect of the
fiduciary duty merges with competence-based professional mal-
practice claims in situations where, because of the professionals'
negligent performance of a service, injuries result. Professional
malpractice is therefore a kind of breach of fiduciary duty.34 How-
ever, it is undivided loyalty-the avoidance of self-dealing-that is
the essence of the fiduciary obligation and distinguishes it from
the competence-based negligence duty of care. While there are
many different circumstances where people, whether they are fidu-
ciaries or not, owe a duty of due care, 5 fiduciaries also owe a duty
of loyalty. Trust and loyalty are what distinguish fiduciary from
non-fiduciary relationships. As one court noted, in a lawyer-as-
fiduciary context: "Professional negligence implicates a duty of
care, while breach of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty of loyalty
32. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). For a more recent example of the language of fidu-
ciary duty, see the Seventh Circuit's majority opinion in Pegram v. Herdrich, 154 F.3d 362, 375
(7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, (2000) (allowing a statutory breach
of fiduciary duty claim against an HMO for harm suffered allegedly because of improper
incentives to limit medical care). The court noted that, "The specter of money concerns
driving the health care system ... 'threaten[s] to transform healing from a covenant into a
business contract. Canons of commerce are displacing dictates of healing, trampling [the
medical] professions' most sacred values." Id.
33. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 651, 653-55 (2002). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 170 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 174 (1959);J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 47-48 (1981); Robert Cooter
& Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Conse-
quences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1047 (1991); Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling,
Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of
the University of California, 42 MERCER L. REV. 989,1000 (1991).
34. Those courts that conclude that breach of fiduciary duty claims against profession-
als are duplicative of malpractice claims are in essence saying that malpractice is a form of
breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E. 2d 496, 503 (Il. 2000) (finding
that medical negligence, not breach of fiduciary duty, is the appropriate claim when physical
injury results from medical treatment). An Illinois appellate court had previously held that a
claim against an attorney for engaging in sexual relations with a client is a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. See Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640 (Ill. App. 1997). However, the Illinois Su-
preme Court in Neade implied that, had the issue of overlap between legal malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty been presented in Doe and other cases, malpractice most likely
would have been found to preempt a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Neade, 739 N.E. 2d
at 505.
35. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 578.
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and honesty.0 6 Without this demand of loyalty, which is not
implicated in many instances where a negligence claim against a
professional is allowed, there would be little to distinguish a fiduci-
ary duty from the ordinary professional duty to perform
competently. When examining the doctor-patient and attorney-
client relationships through the lens of loyalty, it becomes apparent
that the law needs to provide a meaningful remedy for the dignitary
harm resulting from betrayal of trust.
2. Different Types of Harm
The traditional focus of the fiduciary duty is on careful and
faithful property and money management. Thus, as Justice Souter
noted in Pegram v. Herdrich, "At common law, fiduciary duties char-
acteristically attach to decisions about managing assets and
distributing property to beneficiaries. 37 When trustees use trust
funds for their own purposes or when corporate officers engage in
insider trading,8 this self-dealing violates the fiduciary's duty of
loyalty. Most judicially recognized breach of fiduciary duty claims
have involved conflicts of interest resulting in actual or potential
financial loss to the entrustor. However, fiduciary betrayals are not
always about financial or economic loss. In certain areas of legal
practice such as family law, personal injury practice and criminal
defense work, the most serious injuries are frequently non-
economic.4" Similarly, in the medical setting, the harm to patients
36. Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, 717 A.2d 724, 730 (Conn. 1998).
37. 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000).
38. See, e.g., In re Reliance Securities Litigation, 135 F. Supp. 2d 480, 520 n.7 (D. Del.
2001); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969).
39. While they may also experience a feeling of betrayal, the economic loss is the cen-
tral injury. Consider the facts that led to Justice Cardozo's famous language about fiduciary
duty in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. at 546:
Two men engaged in a joint venture in which they leased the Hotel Bristol on 42d
Street and 5th Avenue in New York City for 20 years. Plaintiff Meinhard put up much
of the funding while defendant Salmon was the active manager of the property. Just
as the lease was about to expire, the lessor approached Salmon about a new twenty-
year lease that did not include Meinhard. Salmon signed this lease without having
informed Meinhard. As Cardozo noted: "Whatever his motive may have been, he had
kept the negotiations to himself. Meinhard was not informed even of the bare
existence of a project. The first that he knew of it was ... [w]hen the lease was an
accomplished fact."
Id. at 463.
40. The statutory remedy has less relevance for corporate and other business type of
law involving institutional clients. In these business settings, betrayal of trust is likely to result
in financial loss for which fraud or breach of fiduciary duty actions are, in fact, available.
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caused by betrayal will usually be dignitary and will often be ac-
companied by physical or emotional rather than economic harm.
During the past thirty years, numerous breach of fiduciary duty
claims have been brought where the injury is essentially non-
financial; on review, appellate courts have occasionally allowed
them to go forward . In these cases, the impermissible conflict of
interest may be financial, personal, or both. The parties most fre-
quently sued in these contexts are doctors, lawyers, clergy, and
other professionals whose main role is not managing money or
running a business. Instead, their central role is to provide services
to people who are faced with personal problems that require both
undivided loyalty and the maintenance of confidentiality.
42
41. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (using pa-
tient's bodily materials for financial gain); Perl I, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982) (employing
agent for opposing side of lawsuit); Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640 (Ct. App. I11. 1997) (attor-
ney-client sex).
42. We do not discuss cases involving what has come to be described as "breach of con-
fidentiality" where the harm is caused by unauthorized release of patient or client
information. However, a legislative remedy for betrayal of trust may also be appropriate
there.
Revelation of confidential information without the entrustor's consent is a burgeoning
and complex category of breach of fiduciary duty cases involving professionals and non-
financial harm. Various federal and state statutes and codes of ethics have made this an area
deserving of separate attention. See generally Bobinski, supra note 23, at 352-353; Susan M.
Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1, 39-52 (1995).
Breach of confidentiality can arise in a variety of settings. For example, the United States
Supreme Court decision, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), presented the
issue of whether a doctor is legally justified in breaching doctor-patient confidentiality by
sharing urine tests with police authorities indicating that patients were using cocaine during
pregnancy. The Court concluded that unless the women consented, this violated the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. The consent required must be
after the client is "fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing
waiver require." Id. at 85. Ferguson leaves unanswered the question of whether such revela-
tions by a doctor without informed consent would be viewed as actionable breaches of
confidentiality. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care,
Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1,
18-20 (2002).
A situation where breach of attorney-client confidentiality may result in conviction of the
attorney's client is where the attorney gives damning confidential information to a third
party, and the information is admitted into evidence because it was disclosed outside of the
judicial context. See, e.g., Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 E3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Robert P.
Mosteller, Admissability of Fruits of Breached Evidentiary Privileges: The Importance of Adversarial
Fairness, Party Culpability, and Fear of Immunity, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 961 (2003).
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B. Existing Remedies Are Inadequate
Section II.A, above, explained the importance of trust. This Sec-
tion shows why existing legal remedies are inadequate to address
the harm of betrayal.
Because of the expectation of loyalty stemming from fiduciary
relationships between doctors, lawyers and their entrustors, be-
trayal is especially damaging. Trust is the essence-the heart and
soul-of both the doctor-patient43 and attorney-client relation-
ships.44 A proposal that the law recognize a meaningful remedy
when doctors and lawyers betray this essential trust is a natural
outgrowth of its importance to these fiduciary relationships. This
Section explores possible remedies ranging from money damages
for malpractice to apologies. We conclude that a monetary remedy
for betrayal is the only remedy that both compensates the victim
and provides the type of prophylactic or deterrent effect needed to
avoid future betrayals.
1. Common Law Claims
We begin by offering a brief introduction to several existing
common law claims often raised when certain types of betrayal oc-
cur, and explain why each of those claims fails to provide
appropriate or sufficient recourse.
a. Malpractice
As noted earlier, the harm covered by a claim for malpractice
will often differ from the harm upon which a betrayal of trust claim
is based . In situations where a client suffers no injury beyond the
betrayal itself, a malpractice claim will be impossible to make out.4 6
In cases where harm resulted from incompetence, malpractice may
be available, but if a conflict of interest also existed, malpractice
damages will not provide a remedy for this distinct injury.
Furthermore, concerns regarding who pays, affordability and
availability of insurance and whether the defendant has deep pock-
43. Hall, supra note 8, at 470.
44. Fried, supra note 26.
45. Professional malpractice involves a specific professional duty to exercise reason-
able care, the breach of which causes physical, psychological, or economic injury. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004).
46. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing non-pecuniary harm) & infra Part WA (illustrating
the problems courts have in classifying claims of this nature).
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ets, make it important to distinguish the tort of betrayal of trust
from professional malpractice. This is particularly important when
discussing law's impact on medicine where strong arguments exist
for revamping our current system for remedying medical malprac-
tice. The legitimate concerns about the medical malpractice system
will not be satisfied by continuing to deny a tort remedy for disloy-
alty. Fiduciary betrayals of trust involve very different kinds of
conduct than incompetent treatment or advice. The importance of
trust to both the practice of medicine and law makes providing a
remedy for the dignitary injury resulting from disloyalty compel-
ling.
Providing affordable insurance for doctors and lawyers who be-
tray their entrustors is less of a concern than insuring other claims.
Insurance is not as necessary because most lawyers and doctors can
personally afford to pay the limited damages for betrayals set out in
the proposed statutory tort. Furthermore, doctors and lawyers
should be personally responsible when they engage in intentional
or reckless betrayal because law and medicine are professions de-
signed to help people when most in need, and who are oftentimes
at their most vulnerable. Law and medicine are not merely busi-
nesses or trades: doctors and lawyers are hired to be loyal; to be the
keepers of entrustors' secrets; and to counsel and act on behalf of
their clients and patients. Thus, while doctors and lawyers are not
required to be selfless, selfishness has no place in the fiduciary re-
lationship and when it leads to self-dealing and disloyalty, personal
liability is justified.47
b. Lack of Informed Consent
Similarly, the claim of lack of informed consent is an inadequate
remedy. Lack of informed consent is often described as a form of
medical malpractice.48 Most jurisdictions frame it as a negligence
claim. While courts often proclaim that a traditional lack of in-
formed consent claim protects the rights to self-determination and
47. E.g., Pierce v. Cook, No. 2006-CP-01842-SCT, 2008 WL 3500426 at 10-12 (Miss.
Aug. 14, 2008).
48. See, e.g., Hidding v. Williams, 578 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Ct. App. La. 1991); D.A.B. v.
Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (describes lack of informed consent as a
medical malpractice claim); see also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision
Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607, 620
("[I]nformed consent, as seen by most courts, protects the same interest malpractice and
other negligence torts protect-the interest in being free of injury caused by unreasonable
action.").
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bodily integrity,4 this is highly questionable. As commentators have
noted, if interferences with those interests were viewed as legally
protectable harms in themselves, traditional informed consent
would allow recovery for failure to disclose material risks even if the
risks did not materialize." However, lack of informed consent,
as a negligence claim, does not treat interferences with self-
determination and bodily integrity as compensable harms in and of
themselves. Instead, it requires the traditional negligence elements
of duty to act reasonably, unreasonable conduct, cause-in-fact, and
bodily harm.'
Liability under traditional lack of informed consent is not avail-
able even if there is an extremely unreasonable failure to disclose a
very grave and highly probable risk, unless the physical harm that
this risk creates actually materializes. "Negligence in the air is not
sufficient; there must also be a causal link to a physical injury.
Thus, in an ordinary lack of informed consent case the plaintiff
must prove that the risk was a material one; 3 that had a reasonable
patient been fully informed, she would not have proceeded with
the treatment;54 and that the risk of which she was not informed
actually resulted in physical injury.5 5 An example of a typical in-
formed consent case is a doctor's failure to inform a patient that a
hysterectomy might cause incontinence where, after the surgery,
the patient becomes incontinent and claims that, had she known
of this risk, she and a reasonable person would not have had the
56surgery. In cases where the only harm is dignitary, however, lack
of informed consent is simply unavailable.
49. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scott v. Bradford,
606 P.2d 554, 556--57 (Okla. 1979).
50. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice, 95 YALE L.
J. 219, 251-253 (1985); Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44
ARIz. L. REv. 313, 330-35 (2002).
51. In a few rare cases, recovery for lack of informed consent without any accompany-
ing betrayal may be for purely emotional harm. See Curtis v. MRI Imaging Servs. II, 956 P.2d
960, 961 (Or. 1998) (emotional harm resulting from failing to inform of extreme claustro-
phobia caused by MRI was compensable).
52. SIR FREDERICK POLLACK, THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11 th Ed. 1920).
53. There is a split of authority concerning whether the materiality of the risk is as-
sessed from a reasonable physician's perspective or from a reasonable patient's perspective.
See Richard A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing the Limits of Inforned Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor
and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1997).
54. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.1972).
55. See, e.g., Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145,1148 (Ohio 1985).
56. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (1979).
570 [VOL. 42:3
Tort of Betrayal of Trust
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claims for breach of fiduciary duty typically require a plaintiff to
prove financial harm and therefore provide no remedy to entrustors
whose only harm is dignitary or whose other harm is non-financial as
in the case of medical malpractice. While courts could expand
breach of fiduciary duty claims to cover the cases of dignitary harm
that we are concerned with, they have been reticent in doing so,
most likely out of concern that this would lead to a flood of new
claims and fears of over-deterrence. Only a handful of cases have
allowed breach of fiduciary claims against physicians or attorneys
in situations where the betrayal was not purely financial. Fre-
quently courts declare that breach of fiduciary duty is redundant of
a claim for malpractice or lack of informed consent. 7 This judicial
refusal to recognize that betrayal in non-financial cases is a form of
breach of fiduciary duty provides the main impetus for our pro-
posed legislative remedy.
2. Criminal and Regulatory Intervention
In some areas, where fiduciary betrayals have frequently
occurred, the government has responded by imposing hefty
penalties. For example, when doctors receive kickbacks for
referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to other health care
providers, the federal Anti-Kickback Statute" makes such conduct a
felony and imposes both a criminal fine and civil monetary
penalties. However, even when government regulation is directly
applicable, it still does not address the harms entrustors suffer. It
provides no money to the injured party and therefore fails to take
into account the compensatory, symbolic, therapeutic and justice
purposes money damages serve in cases of betrayal of trust.
Industry pressure, especially in medicine, can also mar attempts at
government regulation of professions. The many safe harbors in
the Anti-Kickback Statute are an example. Similarly, when the
federal Agency for Health Care Policy and Research convened a
panel of experts to examine back-pain issues and to formulate
guidelines for the profession, it came under attack from
57. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006); see also The Stark Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006)
(providing civil penalties where a physician refers Medicare and Medicaid program patients
for health services to an entity in which the physician or a family member has a financial
relationship). However, there are many exceptions or "safe harbors" that make the Anti-
Kickback and Stark statutes much less draconian than they first appear.
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proponents of an expensive and arguably over-used spinal surgery
method called fusion surgery9 The "North American Spine
Society," concerned that the panel was "anti-surgery," lobbied
Congress to cut funding to the panel. The House of
Representatives, against efforts by the American Medical
Association and other professional organizations, attempted to cut
funding entirely. ° Although the Senate restored minimum
funding, the panel's credibility was damaged. This pattern is but
one demonstration of why the regulatory systems cannot be relied
upon to regulate conflicts of interest and betrayals within
professions.
Problems also exist when conflicts of interest result in the provi-
sion of inadequate or incorrect information to the regulating
agency. Recent news reports described the failure of medical re-
searchers, who had a financial stake in a particular medical device,
to inform the FDA of this interest when submitting the results of
clinical trials in order to gain FDA approval of the device. The de-
vice received FDA approval and has been widely used even though
some patients claim that the device was ineffective (or worse) for
its intended purpose.6'
Several states have recently taken steps to track ties between doc-
tors and the drug and device industries." Although these registries
might be public, they do not reflect direct communication between
a doctor and his or her patient. In other words, the disclosure pro-
vided by the doctor flows to the state rather than to the patient.
Nor are these directories properly classified as "regulation" of the
medical profession: the directories require disclosure but do not
limit doctors' ability to receive kickbacks in the first place.
Government regulation in that area is inadequate.
3. Other Alternatives to Litigation
a. Apologies
Most, if not all, betrayals of trust call for an apology, but patients
and clients who have been harmed by betrayal often need more to
be made whole, even if the apology is sincere. Disloyalty, unlike
59. GROOPMAN, supra note 21, at 229-231.
60. Id.
61. Abelson, supra note 11.
62. See Allison Torres Burtka, Drug Companies Go Too Far to Influence Doctors, Critics Say,
TRIAL MAC., October 2007, at 18.
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negligent medical treatment, is personal. In fact, in many cases the
fiduciary did mean to act in a disloyal manner.
Much has been written about the importance of apologies in the
context of harms inflicted by fiduciaries.63 But violations of trust or
acts of betrayal are not mere "mistakes or unfortunate results" that
can be cured by saying "I'm sorry, I didn't mean to betray you. "61 In
the malpractice context, studies show that patients are less likely to
sue when doctors apologize for mistakes they make in treatment.
65
The current trend in medicine and law towards expressly apologiz-
ing for mistakenly injuring patients and patients responding with
forgiveness 66 fits into a patient-focused version of therapeutic juris-
prudence.
However, mistakes made during medical procedures are distinct
from intentional and even negligent betrayals of trust where the
harm is simply more personal. Furthermore, whether or not apolo-
gizing for a betrayal contributes to recovery depends on the quality
of the underlying bad act. Forgiving negligent betrayal is different
than forgiving intentional betrayal. Robert C. Solomon and Fer-
nando Flores' warning in the book Building Trust rings true:
[T] o think of an apology as a sort of social magical wand, for
which forgiveness is automatic and assured, is itself a serious
misunderstanding and a betrayal of trust. To assume that
one's apology erases the error for which it has been issued vio-
lates the trusting relationship, which is that one will take
seriously and try to make amends for one's errors. An apology
is a statement of an intention to redeem oneself, and the be-
67ginning of a conversation about how this can be done.
In short, a sincere apology may contribute to a victim's recovery
following a betrayal. It should be viewed as the beginning of a con-
versation about recovery and damages. But an apology is not,
standing alone, sufficient to remedy the very personal harm an en-
trustor suffers when a fiduciary betrays his or her trust.
63. See, e.g., Steven Keeva, The Power of Apology, ABA L.J., Dec. 1999, at 64-66; Kevin
Sack, Doctors Say "I'm Sorry"Before "See You in Court", N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at Al. See gen-
erally Orenstein, supra note 23, at 255-279.
64. But see Hall, supra note 8, at 494.
65. See, e.g., Keeva, supra note 63; Robeznieks, supra note 23; Sack, supra note 63, at 66,
68. See generaUy Orenstein, supra note 23, at 255-279.
66. See Keeva, supra note 63, at 66, 95; Sack, supra note 63.
67. ROBERT C. SOLOMON & FERNANDO FLORES, BUILDING TRUST IN BUSINESS, RELA-
TIONSHIPS, AND LIFE 133 (2001).
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b. Peer Review and Private Regulation
Peer review and regulation via ethics boards may help deter doc-
tors and lawyers from acting in a manner contrary to professional
standards or guidelines. However, there is substantial evidence that
current peer review is not effectively preventing doctors and law-
yers from engaging in conflicts of interest.6 For example, the
Journal of the American Medical Association published a paper in 2006
calling for academic medical institutions to self-police the many
ties between the pharmaceutical and medical device industries and
the medical profession.69
Whether or not peer review is effective in punishing some dis-
loyal professionals, it fails to address the harm that disloyalty does
to entrustors. Even when peer review results in a published admo-
nition and limits the professional's ability to practice law or
medicine, the betrayed entrustor is left uncompensated.
Of course, we do not discourage professions from undertaking
peer review or from using ethics boards to govern themselves. In-
deed, these are important functions. Our concern is that such self-
policing does nothing to make the injured person whole again,
save for some possible public airing of a grievance. The statutory
remedy for betrayal of trust is aimed at compensating the victim for
the harm done by the professional. By offering compensation, it
encourages the entrustor to bring the betrayal to the law's atten-
tion. Coupled with industry self-policing, the statutory remedy fills
the gap left by peer-review mechanisms. Both have the desired ef-
fect of making professionals and professions take trust seriously.
C. A New, Distinct Tort is Needed
A new distinct tort of betrayal of trust is needed in order to
make professionals and professions take loyalty and trust seriously.
In addition, a monetary remedy will frequently have a restorative
therapeutic value that an insincere or half-hearted apology does
not and will make doctors and lawyers both appear and be more
deserving of trust.
Betrayals of trust by doctors and lawyers take many different
forms. Some, notably those involving criminal behavior such as sex
68. See Orenstein, supra note 23, at 265 n.226 (physician's self-regulation is inade-
quate). See generally, Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors,
70 TUL. L. REV. 2583 (1996) (proposing that legal malpractice suits replace attorney self-
regulation).
69. See Brennan et al., supra note 9.
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with a minor70 or acceptance of kickbacks,7' are per se betrayals that
even an entrustor's informed consent will not cure. In other situa-
tions, a betrayal of trust can be avoided if the entrustor consents to
the fiduciary's conduct after receiving sufficiently timely and accu-S 72
rate information. In still other cases, trust is only betrayed if the
fiduciary provides misleading or false information or intentionally
conceals material information.7 The common thread that links
these diverse situations is that a fiduciary puts his or her personal
interest ahead of the interests of the entrustor resulting in the dig-
nitary injury of betrayal. Providing a carefully circumscribed
monetary remedy for the dignitary injury caused by disloyalty
would demonstrate that the law believes trust matters. Requiring
doctors and lawyers to pay those whom they betray would encour-
age loyalty and trustworthiness. The bite of monetary damages
would serve as both corrective justice and a punishment for dis-
loyal behavior.
1. Compensatory and Other Effects of Money Damages
Personal to the Injured Party
Money is, quite simply, the kind of remedy for harm that Ameri-
cans view as most effective. A tort remedy means that the betrayed
entrustor will at least partially be "made whole 74 through money
damages, the mechanism most commonly used when injuries to
legally recognized personal rights occur. In our society everything,
whether tangible or intangible, is valued in monetary terms. Thus,
in the context of fiduciary disloyalty and betrayal, commodification
70. In re Wolf, 826 P.2d 628 (Or. 1992) (personal injury attorney has sexual relations
with his minor client).
71. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (doctor accepted kick-
backs from pharmaceutical company).
72. The Moore fact pattern is an example of a situation where a doctor could have
avoided breaching his fiduciary duty if he had revealed his financial interest in advance of
treatment, and sought and received the patient's informed consent. See Moore v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); discussion infra Part IV.AI.
73. Examples include cases where a doctor who knows he committed malpractice in-
tentionally conceals this fact from his patient. See, e.g., Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131
(5th Cir. 1976); Brown v. Bleiberg, 651 P.2d 815 (Cal. 1982). In other cases, when asked,
physicians provide false information about their skills or state of health. See, e.g., Howard v.
Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002).
74. The concept of restoring the person to the status quo ante or making the victim
whole, at least metaphorically and symbolically, through money damages, is widely viewed as
a major purpose of tort law. See Heidi L. Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance
Theoy of Tort Compensation, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1567, 1577-1580 (1997).
75. MargaretJ. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DuKE L.J. 56, 74 (1993).
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of the dignitary interest of trust is a good thing.7" Providing a tort
for betrayal of trust demonstrates, both substantively and symboli-
cally, that the dignitary interest in loyalty, when injured, is harm
worth compensating, and that it matters. As Margaret Radin ob-
serves: "In a quid pro quo conception of compensation, payment is
in return for rights that are violated. '' 77 She notes further:
Requiring payment is a way both to bring the wrongdoer to
recognize that she had done wrong and to make redress to
the victim.... Redress ... means showing the victim that her
rights are taken seriously. It is accomplished by affirming that
some action is required to symbolize public respect for the ex-
istence of certain rights and public recognition of the
transgressor's fault in disrespecting those rights.
78
Disloyalty upsets the moral balance between a fiduciary and en-
trustor. Awarding compensation for this dignitary injury, by
correcting this injustice, restores the balance.79
Providing money damages for breaches of fiduciary loyalty is
widely accepted and uncontroversial when it comes to economic
disloyalty.80 Extending liability for disloyalty to dignitary injuries
through tort law can be compared to the law's current recognition
of the legally protected dignitary interests of reputation, privacy,
and bodily integrity, all of which, when harmed, have well-accepted
common law tort claims providing money damages.8 ' The torts of
libel and slander for defaming a person's reputation have existed
for hundreds of years. Similarly, assault, false imprisonment, and
offensive battery, which all provide money damages for interfer-
ences with bodily integrity, have a long history. The fact that the
harm suffered is usually purely dignitary rather than financial has
not deterred the law from compensating such harms. In contrast-
as is currently the case with betrayals of trust that cause non-
financial harm-until relatively recently, there was no right to
76. See generally MargaretJ. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
77. Radin, supra note 75, at 59.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Many commentators have written about corrective justice as an important reason
for providing the tort remedy of money damages. See generally DOBBS, supra note 22, at 13-15
(citing various books and articles on corrective justice).
80. See supra Part II.A.2.
81. See DOBBS, supra note 22, at 1115. Another non-economic interest for which a tort
law in the twentieth century began to provide a remedy is intentional infliction of emotional
distress. A major impetus was William Prosser's article Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:
A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939). In contrast to the dignitary torts of defamation and
interference with the right of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
focus on a particular valued right like reputation, privacy or fiducial loyalty.
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money damages when a person's privacy was invaded. Even though
our society highly values privacy,82 tort remedies for invasion of pri-
vacy were not allowed until the twentieth century.8 3 The first
recognition of a right of privacy tort was legislative.84 Today most
states allow either common law or statutory torts for violations of
the right of privacy.8" The existence of these established dignitary
tort claims demonstrates that providing a tort remedy for betrayals
of trust would not be something extraordinary for the law to do.
Another justification for a monetary remedy (and for the tort of
betrayal of trust itself) is reflected in the equity maxim, "[e]quity
will not suffer a wrong without a remedy."86 Most of the "no right
without a remedy" scholarship and case law focuses on analyzing
what statutory limits on common law torts claims are permissible8
under the thirty-five state constitutions that provide specific reme-
dies clauses."' The venerable doctrine of ubi ius ibi remedium (no
right without a remedy), however, has much more ancient roots
than state constitutions,89 and when rights are violated it should
support claims for statutory remedies as well as claims against statu-
tory limitations on remedies. 0 When the long-recognized and
important equitable right to fiduciary loyalty is betrayed, liability
should not depend on the kind of harm suffered. For deterrence,
82. One torts commentator describes the value of privacy as follows:
A degree of privacy is probably required for full human development. It is essential to
personal autonomy and liberty and it is treasured, even by the most open and gre-
garious people, as important to the quality of life, valuable in itself. In addition,
privacy of individuals reflectively asserts a limit on the power of other individuals,
corporations, and government entities.
DOBBS, supra note 22, at 1197.
83. The impetus for allowing a tort of right of privacy was the famous law review by
Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
DOBBS, supra note 22, at 1197.
84. N.Y. Civ. RTs. L. §§ 50-51. Originally, courts rejected the tort of right of privacy. See
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
85. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 1197.
86. David Schuman, Oregon's Remedy Guarantee: Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitu-
tion, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 35 n.1 (1986) (citing 2JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 423, at 185
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (1882)).
87. See, e.g., Jonathan Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Under-
stand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001); Thomas R. Phillips,
The Constitutional Right to Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1309 (2003); David Schuman, The Right to
a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197 (1992).
88. 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES app.6, 6-65 to 6-67 (3d ed. 2000).
89. See Phillips, supra note 87, at 1319-20; see also Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Ac-
tion in Tort: A Statutoy/Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REv. 781,811-812 (1990).
90. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing appropriateness of a statutory tort remedy).
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symbolic, and compensatory reasons, a specific limited tort remedy
should exist for betrayal of trust.
Furthermore, a monetary remedy provides corrective justice. As
Margaret Radin explains:
[C]orrective justice means to make required changes in an
unjustified state of affairs between an injurer and a victim,
when the injurer's activity has caused the injustice, so that
such changes bring about a just state of affairs between them,
and one that is related in a morally appropriate way to the
status quo ante. A shorthand way of saying this is that correc-
tive justice restores moral balance between the parties.9'
Because of the vulnerability of patients and clients, trust is the es-
sence of physician and attorney fiduciary relationships. Especially in
the areas of medicine and family, tort and criminal defense law, an
entrustor has highly personal needs at a time of crisis and risk. The
vulnerable state in which the entrustor comes to the fiduciary makes
the extreme levels of trust that are given in these settings under-
standable. Professor Mark Hall correctly notes that "[w]hat is
specific to [our trust relationships with professionals] is the peculiar
constellation of urgency, intimacy, unavoidability, unpredictability,
and extraordinary vulnerability within which trust must be given. 9
What choice do wounded entrustors have but to turn their lives over
to doctors and lawyers under these circumstances? The fact that the
circumstances are unavoidable, unpredictable, urgent, and occur at
a time of extreme vulnerability implies that entrustors' trust is man-
datory. In such circumstances, loyalty should be mandatory too,
not just in words, but also in fact. The law needs to assist in this
endeavor by encouraging loyalty through compensating entrustors
when fiduciary disloyalty injures them.93
2. Statutory, Not Common Law
The previous Sections demonstrated the importance of fiduciary
trust in doctor-patient and attorney-client relationships and why a
monetary damages remedy is needed to provide a satisfactory rem-
edy for the betrayed entrustor. This Section explains why a
statutory tort, instead of a common law remedy, is the most appro-
91. Radin, supra note 75, at 60.
92. Hall, supra note 8, at 479.
93. We previously demonstrated the lack of effective remedies currently available. See
supra Part II.B.
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priate and practical mechanism for preserving and restoring this
trust. The legitimate concerns about the risks of overly deterring
and overly punishing make a limited statutory tort the better legal
response.
The importance of trust is intimately tied to the necessarily
broad discretion that doctors and lawyers have to manage the per-
sonal interests of entrustors. As Professor M. Gregg Bloche writes,
"[d]iscretion, poorly scrutinized, invites opportunism., 94 This dis-
cretion enables doctors and lawyers to help their vulnerable
patients and clients who lack the expertise to help themselves.
However, it is inevitable that some fiduciaries will abuse their dis-
cretion unless it is monitored. As noted previously, however,
leaving this monitoring solely to the professions themselves or gov-
ernmental regulation is inadequate. Yet courts have been reluctant
to provide a common law tort remedy that would encourage moni-
toring and compensate victims of professional disloyalty. We believe
that courts are likely concerned that it would be difficult to provide
any reasonable limitation on the extent or scope of damages for dis-
loyalty and therefore over-deterrence and over-punishment could
result. In contrast, a limited statutory tort of betrayal of trust en-
courages patients and clients to subject doctors and lawyers to the
scrutiny of the judicial system when disloyalty and self-dealing are
suspected. Knowing such scrutiny is a serious possibility will help de-
ter doctors and lawyers from being disloyal but the limited damages
will assure that the lawyers' and doctors' necessary exercise of discre-
tion and judgment on behalf of the entrustor will be unhampered.
3. Other Torts Have Evolved Similarly When Necessary
Statutory torts are increasingly common.95 Universally accepted
statutory torts include wrongful death statutes96 and statutes that
permit lawsuits against formerly immune governmental entities.
Recently, legislatures have been actively involved in statutory "tort
reform" that places legislative limits on existing common law
claims in this context.9 8 We advocate that legislatures continue to
serve as providers of remedies for injuries that the common law has
94. Bloche, supra note 8, at 930.
95. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Caroline
Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se, What's the Difference?, 77 OR.
L. REv. 497, 499, 515-24 (1998).
96. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (2004).
97. See, e.g., id. § 30.265.
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (2007) (cap on medical liability); MD. CTS. &JuD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (West 1992) (cap on non-economic damages).
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failed to address adequately by enacting the tort of betrayal of
trust.
The history of wrongful death claims illustrates how legislatures
sometimes step in to remedy harm where courts have refused to do
so.99 Of course, negligently, recklessly or intentionally killing some-
one is a serious harm; it is, after all, the ultimate interference with
the right to life. Yet, as William Prosser wryly noted, until the mid-
nineteenth century it was cheaper to kill someone than to maim
them.00 Up through the 1840's, American courts either refused to
provide a tort remedy when death of the victim resulted 1' or pro-
vided a remedy that was both inadequate and inequitable.
10 2
Following the example of Britain, which enacted Lord Campbell's
Act in 1846,103 in 1847 New York's legislature enacted a statutory
tort claim for wrongful death on behalf of dependent wives and
children for the loss of support resulting from their male pro-
vider's death.' 4 Soon most states enacted similar statutes, some also
allowing claims by widowers. 10 Today all states provide statutory
wrongful death tort claims for survivors of the deceased victims.'
Like courts' adamant refusal to provide an appropriate remedy
for wrongful death, courts today refuse to provide a tort remedy
for non-monetary betrayals of fiduciary trust. The current hostility
to malpractice suits and the concern about runaway jury verdicts
makes it highly unlikely that, in the foreseeable future, courts will
recognize an unlimited claim for breach of fiduciary duty/betrayal
of trust for dignitary injury and any accompanying emotional and
physical harm. Indeed, the resistance to providing a common law
remedy for betrayal claims may be justified. Fears of over-deterrence
resulting from jury confusion, double recovery, runaway jury ver-
99. Another example is the refusal of most courts to abolish the harsh doctrine of "all
or nothing" contributory negligence, leaving it to legislatures in the 1960's and 70's to enact
comparative fault statutes that allowed injured parties to recover damages even if their own
negligent behavior in some way contributed to their being injured. This effectively allowed a
whole new class of victims to recover in tort when they were wrongfully harmed by another.
See DOBBS, supra note 22, at 503-04.
100. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945
(5th ed. 1984).
101. See, e.g., Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 797 (Or. 1995) (no tort action for wrongful
death existed at common law).
102. John F. Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the
Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 717, 731-732 (2000) (explaining that most American appellate courts originally
allowed wrongful death actions but only for loss of services and only by masters, husbands,
and fathers for their servants, wives and children).
103. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
104. 1847 N.Y. Laws c. 450, § 1, at 575.
105. Witt, supra note 102, at 736-37.
106. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 430 (2d ed. 1993).
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dicts, or false or trivial claims may be legitimate policy reasons
against common law routes to recovery. However, as discussed ear-
lier, such a remedy is needed for compensatory, prophylactic,
symbolic, corrective and restorative justice, and punitive reasons. A
statutory remedy, unlike a common law remedy, will adequately ad-
dress these concerns, and should be enacted by state legislatures. In
the next Part, we propose a framework for a statutory tort of betrayal
of trust that includes limitations on damages that likely will survive
constitutional challenge0 7 and requires clear and convincing evi-
dence for certain elements to ensure that only clear cases of
disloyalty will result in liability.
III. THE TORT OF BETRAYAL OF TRUST
We describe the basic outline of the tort of betrayal of trust be-
low. This proposal is one example of what a statutory tort for
betrayal of trust might look like. There are myriad ways in which
this proposal could be modified.
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BETRAYAL OF TRUST
BY ATTORNEY OR PHYSICIAN
(1) Betrayal; Cause of Action.
a. It is unlawful for an attorney or physician licensed in this
state to breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to an
entrustor by putting his or her interest above that of the en-
trustor. Such a breach is a betrayal to trust.' °s
b. It is unlawful for an employer of an attorney or a physician
licensed in this state to negligently, recklessly or intentionally
contribute to a betrayal of trust as described above.
107. Most states' wrongful death statutes originally included specific dollar limitations
on recovery. For example, when Massachusetts enacted the first wrongful death statute, the
maximum recoverable was $5000. Witt, supra note 102, at 733-34 (2000). See also Goheen v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 502 P.2d 223, 228 (Or. 1972) (Oregon's original wrongful death statute
limited damages to $5000).
Courts that have addressed the constitutionality of specific limits on amounts of recovery
in tort actions created by statute that did not exist at common law have generally upheld
those limits. See, e.g., English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1989) (cap
on recovery against charities is constitutional); Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 797 (Or.
1995) (same); Maurin v. Hall, 682 N.W.2d 866, 888-92 (Wis. 2004) (same). See generaUy Phil-
lips, supra note 87, at 1337 n.121.
108. Clearly, terms such as "entrustor" would have to be defined in any statute. We have
left such definitions out of this model statute in the interest of conserving space.
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(2) Harm.
a. A private cause of action for a betrayal under Section (1) of
this statute is available when any common law claim for physi-
cal, financial, or emotional harm is also available, but
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty preempts recovery un-
der Section (1).
b. A private cause of action for betrayal under Section (1) of
this statute is available without proof of a common law claim
for physical, financial, or emotional harm if the attorney or
physician's disloyal conduct was intentional or reckless.
(3) Standard of Proof
a. To recover under Section (1)(a), an entrustor must prove
attorney or physician disloyalty by clear and convincing evi-
dence.
b. To recover under Section (1) (b), an entrustor must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney or phy-
sician's employer acted negligently, recklessly or intentionally
in contributing to the attorney or physician's betrayal.
(4) Limitations Period. An action to recover damages under
this Section shall be brought within two years of the date the
act of disloyalty is discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered. However, every such action
shall be commenced within five years from the date of the act
of disloyalty or, if there has been no action commenced
within five years because of fraud, deceit or misleading repre-
sentation, then within two years from the date such fraud,
deceit or misleading representation is discovered, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.
(5) Damages.
a. A plaintiff proving violation of this statute shall be entitled
to collect compensatory damages that shall not exceed
$50,000 per incident, $100,000 per plaintiff, and $500,000 for
all betrayals of a similar type caused by the same attorney or
physician.
Tort of Betrayal of Trust
b. A plaintiff proving by clear and convincing evidence a vio-
lation of this statute based on an intentional betrayal may be
entitled to collect punitive damages that shall not exceed
$50,000.
(6) Attorney Fees. A court shall award an entrustor prevailing
under this statute reasonable attorney's fees and costs, includ-
ing attorney's fees and costs associated with any appeal.
Regardless of its parameters, the major advantage to a statutory
claim of betrayal of trust is that, like a statutory wrongful death ac-
tion, it can provide clear limits on who can be sued, who can sue,
how much they can sue for, and under what circumstances.
We propose that only state-licensed medical doctors and attor-
neys who had physician-patient or attorney-client fiduciary
relationships with the entrustor at the time of the alleged betrayal
and their employers whose alleged wrongdoing contributed to the
betrayal may be sued.' °9 If the entrustor is dead as a result of mal-
practice or betrayal, the claim should belong to the entrustor's
estate.
The claim for betrayal of trust would be available in two situa-
tions where disloyalty is the harm for which recovery is sought.
First, where a betrayal is intentional or reckless, but only the digni-
tary harm of betrayal can be proved, statutory liability would be
available for that harm regardless of whether there was any prov-
able physical, financial, or severe emotional harm. For example,
suppose that a family law attorney has sexual relations with his or
her client during the time that the client is seeking a divorce. Even if
the attorney competently completes the legal work related to the
divorce and therefore no legal malpractice claim would be available,
the client most likely could prove an intentional or reckless be-
trayal and therefore recover under the statutory claim. Second,
where betrayal is negligent, reckless or intentional, and malprac-
tice or another common law tort is also proved, recovery under the
statute would be available in addition to the damage award under
the common law claim. This would assure that there is compensa-
tion for the dignitary injury of betrayal apart from the injury for
which damages are recoverable under the common law claim. For
109. While all professionals for whom a major aspect of their practice is counseling,
therapy, or medical treatment could be included, we propose limiting the statutory tort to
these two professions because they are easily identifiable through state licensing and many
of the cases involving fiduciary betrayal have been brought against these professionals. If a
state finds that a statutory tort for betrayal of trust is effective against these two groups it can
then decide whether to expand the tort to cover other groups of professionals.
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example, where a surgeon substantially overstates his experience
and then, during surgery, permanently paralyzes his patient, it is
likely that the patient could prove intentional or reckless misrepre-
sentation, and therefore the betrayal of trust statutory remedy
would be available to the victim. In addition, these facts would
likely support a separate negligence-based malpractice or lack of
informed consent claim for the physical harm suffered by the vic-
tim.
To prevent double recovery, an award of damages for a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty would not be permitted if an entrustor
recovered under a statutory betrayal claim under the same set of
facts. Both claims could be brought in the alternative but a damage
award could only be made under one or the other. The separate
statutory betrayal of trust claim would require clear and convincing
evidence of disloyalty so that there would be strong proof that the
fiduciary placed his or her self-interest ahead of the entrustor's in-
terest.
The amount of compensatory damages recoverable for the
purely dignitary injury arising from betrayal of trust would be lim-
ited to a maximum of $50,000 per incident, $100,000 per person,
and $500,000 for all betrayals of a similar type caused by the same
individual.110 Punitive damages could be awarded if clear and con-
vincing evidence of an intentional betrayal was proved, but these
damages would be limited to no more than $50,000.
An award of attorney fees in addition to the limited recovery for
compensatory damages is also advisable to encourage both entrus-
tors to bring, and attorneys to take, these kinds of cases by
ensuring that the compensation for both the entrustor and the at-
torney is fair and reasonable. The prophylactic benefit of bringing
these claims justifies this form of incentive. Therefore, an award of
attorney fees following recovery for the betrayal of trust would be
appropriate.
An employer of the doctor or lawyer who is liable for betrayal of
trust could also be held liable if, by the preponderance of evi-
dence, it is proved that the employer's negligent, reckless or
intentional conduct contributed to the betrayal. If an employer is
liable under this statute, the liability of the employer and doctor or
lawyer would be joint and several for the entire amount of statutory
damages awarded. Joint and several liability provides one less ob-
stacle to recovery, allowing the victim to recover the full statutory
110. Obviously these are arbitrary figures that a legislature could change. However, in
order for this tort to be effective without over-deterring and to be politically acceptable,
some reasonable limit on the amount of recoverable damages is necessary.
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amount from either the employer or the professional. It also adds
an additional incentive for employers to prevent the unethical be-
havior of their employees.
Often courts have held that breach of fiduciary duty claims for
the kinds of harms described by this proposed statute are barred by
the statute of limitations for malpractice."' It would therefore be
important to establish a separate statute of limitations for bringing
a claim for betrayal of trust. The limitations period would not be-
gin to run until the discovery of the betrayal, and a claim for
betrayal of trust could proceed even when the statute of limitations
for other injuries such as malpractice or lack of informed consent
had already run. Thus, entrustors would not be denied recovery-
at least in terms of the statute of limitations hurdle-by active con-
cealment of conflicts of interest or other betrayals. Instead, like a
standard fraud claim, an entrustor could bring a betrayal claim
within a statutory period that begins running upon discovery. So
long as a discovery rule is clearly set out in the statute, the statutory
period could be as short as one or two years from discovery.
All the above proposals regarding a statutory tort for betrayal of
trust are obviously subject to modification. They are simply sugges-
tions for what the tort should look like. The following sections
describe cases in California, Illinois and Minnesota involving doc-
tors and lawyers who betrayed the trust of their patients and
clients. For the most part, courts refused to provide a remedy or
provided a clearly inadequate remedy. The proposed statute is ap-
plied to these various case scenarios to illustrate how, if enacted, a
tort of betrayal of trust would work.
IV. CASE STUDIES AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW TORT
As demonstrated above, a new statutory remedy for betrayal of
trust is justified. Fitting clear betrayals by doctors and lawyers into
currently available common law remedies is like fitting a round peg
into a square hole. Thus, not surprisingly, existing common law
claims usually leave a betrayed entrustor without any remedy what-
soever when the harm is solely to a plaintiffs dignitary interests.
Even when a betrayal coincides with a provable malpractice or lack
of informed consent claim, no remedy for the betrayal itself is cur-
rently available. In a series of cases, beginning with the landmark
case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California,'2 we demonstrate
111. See, e.g., D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
112. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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how courts have struggled with the inadequate menu of remedies
in situations where a plaintiff entrustor has been wronged-often
in a highly disturbing fashion-by a doctor or lawyer in a fiduciary
relationship. After examining Moore, we engage in a discussion of
Neade v. Portes, a case where the Illinois Supreme Court put an end
to the short life of breach of fiduciary duty as a remedy for betrayal
based on a doctor's financial conflict of interest. The Neade out-
come provides a compelling justification for adoption of our
statutory tort. Finally, we address a group of Minnesota cases where
the court provides a remedy for betrayals by lawyers on one hand,
but denies the same remedy for betrayals by doctors. Our proposed
statutory tort would compensate the victims of such betrayals by
both doctors and lawyers, thereby providing consistency as well as
justice.
A. Eliminating Confusion over Permissible Claims
The following Section demonstrates that our proposed statutory
tort will alleviate problems that already plague the courts when at-
tempting to use existing remedies to address betrayals of trust by
professionals. Our proposed statutory tort would have given these
courts a useful tool to remedy the harm suffered by the plaintiffs in
both Moore v. Regents of the University of California and Neade v. Portes.
1. Moore v. Regents of the University of California
Moore v. Regents of the University of California is both important and
unique."3 In Moore, the Supreme Court of California unani-
mously1 4 allowed a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a
physician who removed his patient's spleen and repeatedly took
samples of his patient's cells without informing him of the physi-
cian's preexisting financial and research interests in his bodily
materials. While doctors are widely viewed as owing their patients a
fiduciary duty,"5 Moore is the only reported case to have allowed an
independent claim of breach of fiduciary duty action against a
113. Id. Moore is the subject of much academic commentary and is regularly taught in
both first year Torts and Property courses. See Keith Sealing, Teaching Fundamental Learning
Techniques with Moore v. Regnts of the University of California, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 755 (2002).
114. Even though there were dissents and concurrences in Moore, all the justices agreed
that a breach of fiduciary duty claim was available. Id. at 485 (majority opinion); id. at 499
(Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 506, 518-19 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting).
115. See, e.g., Lockett v. Goodall, 430 E2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967).
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medical doctor for harm other than cases involving release of con-
fidential information without the patient's consent." 6 It provides a
clear example of an intentional betrayal of trust where the doctor's
care was competent and therefore the only basis for a legal remedy
is the betrayal.
Moore is a controversial decision with compelling facts. The is-
sues raised by the plaintiffs assertions concerning corruption of
the doctor-patient relationship and the California Supreme Court's
half-hearted attempt to provide a remedy demonstrate why a sepa-
rate claim for betrayal of trust for non-financial injury is needed.
Plaintiff Moore made the following allegations: He consulted
with Dr. Golde at UCLA Medical Center because he was suffering
from hairy cell leukemia, Golde recommended that Moore's
spleen be removed, and Golde informed Moore "that he had rea-
son to fear for his life, and that the proposed splenectomy
operation ... was necessary to slow down the progress of his dis-
ease.""7 Based upon Golde's representations, Moore signed a
written consent form authorizing the splenectomy." s
At the time Golde made this recommendation, he had a per-
sonal and scientific interest in Moore's spleen and already had
made arrangements to do research on it that was unrelated to
Moore's medical care." 9 Golde did not reveal these non-
therapeutic interests to Moore. Following the surgery, Golde also
arranged for Moore's return to UCLA Medical Center from his
home in Seattle about twice a year over the course of seven years."2
116. There are a few cases involving sexual relations between physician and patient
where a medical malpractice claim has been proven through showing a breach of fiduciary
duty. See Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242-243 (Nev. 1986) (patient allowed to sue
doctor for malpractice for taking sexual advantage of her in violation of fiduciary duty); Roy
v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 298-301 (Civ. Ct. 1975) (sexual relationship as treatment for
sexual problems as breach of fiduciary duty is basis for malpractice); Omer v. Edgren, 685
P.2d 635, 636-37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (finding sexual relationship in breach of fiduciary
duty as basis for malpractice by psychiatrist).
There is also one case involving a chiropractor who routinely administered and charged
patients for unnecessary procedures. The court, while finding verdicts for fraudulent mis-
representation and breach of fiduciary duty to be duplicative, ended up allowing the breach
of fiduciary duty claim instead of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim because the puni-
tive damages under breach of fiduciary duty were greater than those under fraudulent
misrepresentation. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
A few courts have framed claims involving release of confidential information without the
patient's consent as breach of fiduciary duty claims. See Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 953
(Ala. 1984) ("Alabama recognizes causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty ... resulting
from a physician's unauthorized disclosure of information."); Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 240
(S. Ct. 1992) ("Plaintiff has made out a case for breach of fiduciary ... duy.. .
117. 793P.2dat481.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR 1 (2001 Crown).
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During these visits, Golde took samples of Moore's "blood, blood
serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm."2  He claimed that
these procedures had a therapeutic basis as well as serving purely
academic research. In fact, during this time period, Golde and
others conducted research on Moore's cells and developed "a cell
line from Moore's T-lymphocytes." 122 Patent #4,438,032123 was
granted to Golde and he shared in the profits derived from it.
Golde also negotiated for commercial development of the "Mo-cell
line" 124 and became a paid consultant for a substantial sum of
125
money.
Moore sued Golde and others for this commercial use of his
bodily material without his knowledge or consent. The three claims
that the California Supreme Court addressed were conversion, lack
of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary duty. Moore's essen-
tial allegation was that his doctor surreptitiously planned to and
did use his bodily materials for research and financial gain over the
course of a multi-year doctor-patient relationship. The allegation
evokes strong emotions that Moore's own words support:
My doctors are claiming that my humanity, my genetic
essence, is their invention, their property. They view me as a
mine from which to extract biological material. I was
harvested. 1
26
Moore also said he felt "'violated for dollars,' 'invaded,' and
'raped.' ,127
121. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. These frequent trips to UCLA were "both expensive and
time consuming" yet Golde insisted that it was "not in [Moore's] best interest" to have the
tests done in Seattle. Adam Stone, The Strange Case ofJohn Moore and His Splendid Stolen
Spleen: A Case Study in Science, Technology, and American Courts (1996), (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley), available at http://www.biology.buffalo.edu/
courses/bio129/medlerjlectures/visuals/John_Moore.html. Golde even suggested that "if
money were a problem, [Moore] could be compensated by money from Dr. Golde's re-
search grant." Id. Additionally, Golde "offered to put Moore up at the Beverly Willshire
Hotel." Id.
122. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
123. According to Andrews & Nelkin, things were so weird that Moore contacted a law-
yer, Jonathan Zackey, about it. When Zackey went online to learn more, he read Golde's
scientific publications. One, in Science, described patenting nine products from the "Mo-cell-
line" based on the bodily materials of "a 37-year-old white male from Seattle whose blood
contained unusual and valuable viral antibodies." ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 120, at
27-28.
124. Id. at 28.
125. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
126. ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 120, at 1.
127. Id. at 28.
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The injuries that Moore suffered at the hands of Golde do not
fit easily under traditional tort theories." Two camps have vied
over what is the essence of the harm in Moore. The case involved
property-based and dignity-based claims, neither of which the ma-
jority adequately addresses.' Some, including the intermediate
appellate court 130 and Justice Mosk in dissent,' view the central
harm as proprietary and property-based. They argue that the ma-
jority erred in denying a property-based claim for the unauthorized
conversion of Moore's bodily material into a patented cell line for
which he received no compensation.3 2 Others view the essence of
the harm as dignity-based and therefore assert that a breach of fi-
duciary duty or similar claim such as the proposed tort of betrayal
of trust is appropriate. 13 The Moore decision disappointed both
camps.
128. The original lawsuit included thirteen different legal claims: "(1) '[c]onversion';
(2) 'lack of informed consent'; (3) 'breach of fiduciary duty'; (4) 'fraud and deceit';
(5) 'unjust enrichment'; (6) 'quasi-contract'; (7) 'bad faith breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing'; (8) 'intentional infliction of emotional distress'; (9) 'negligent
misrepresentation'; (10) 'intentional interference with prospective advantageous economic
relationships'; (11) 'slander of tide'; (12) 'accounting'; and (13) 'declaratory relief.'" Moore,
793 P.2d at 482 n.4.
129. Justice Broussard's concurring and dissenting opinion in Moore, 793 P.2d at 498-506,
comes closest to recognizing the two important harms that the law should remedy. He would
have allowed the conversion claim. Id. at 499. He also explicitly noted that the informed con-
sent/fiduciary duty claim here should differ from the traditional negligence-based claim by not
mandating that Moore prove that, had he been informed, a reasonable person in his position
would not have agreed to go forward with the procedures. Id. at 500. However, his agree-
ment with the majority's view that the essence of the harm here is that the doctor's conflict
of interest "may potentially affect his ... professional judgment" fails to take into account
the bodily integrity and betrayal harms involved. Id. at 499.
130. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Reptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988).
131. Moore, 793 P.2d at 506-523 (Mosk,J., dissenting).
132. See Laura Ivey, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Protec-
tion of Patients' Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REv. 489, 498-99, 512-32 (1991);
Jeffrey Potts, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Expanded Disclosure, Limited
Property Rights, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 478-88 (1992).
133. A new common law claim, described as breach of the right to be treated with dig-
nity, has been asserted in a few cases. This claim was alleged in Diaz v. Hillsborough County
Hospital Authority, 165 ER.D. 689 (M.D. Fla. 1996), a class action against Tampa General
Hospital and the University of South Florida for performing experimental procedures on
poor pregnant women without informing them. The parties settled in 2000 for $3.8 million.
Stephen F Hanlon & Robyn S. Shapiro, Ethical Issues in Biomedical Research: Diaz v. Hillsbor-
ough County Hospital Authority, A.B.A. HuM. RTs. MAG. 7 (Spring 2003). Since then this
claim has also been alleged in a number of lawsuits brought by attorney Allen Milstein alleg-
ing misconduct by researchers and hospitals in relation with clinical trials. See Marie
McCullough, Lawyer Sees His Role as Warning to Clinical Researchers, http://sskrplaw.com/
publications/5-20allan.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). No appellate court has yet approved
this claim.
Many commentators have unsuccessfully urged that courts allow a dignity-based claim
when doctors fail to provide their patients with material facts concerning medical treatment.
See articles proposing a new tort in Morris, supra note 50, at 342 n. 162.
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The Moore majority rejected the property-based conversion
claim. And although they allowed the breach of fiduciary duty
claim, the majority held that in this instance it was interchangeable
with the lack of informed consent claim.1 34 Tying breach of
fiduciary duty to lack of informed consent, and failing to elaborate
on what the plaintiff needed to prove before damages could be
recovered under these theories, effectively gutted the fiduciary
duty claim. As Justice Mosk said in his dissent, this claim is "largely
a paper tiger.
' 35
Regardless of whether property-based compensation for the un-
authorized use of Moore's cells had been allowed, an independent
dignity-based claim for betrayal of trust, instead of the traditional
negligence-based lack of informed consent claim, should have
been provided for Golde's clear disloyalty to his patient/entrustor.
Dr. Golde's alleged conduct severely compromised Moore's bodily
integrity, his ability to determine what was in his own best interests,
and his right to expect that his doctor would place Moore's inter-
ests ahead of his own.
The conduct involves two distinct acts of disloyalty. First,
Dr. Golde failed to reveal his preexisting research and potential
economic interest at the time he advised Moore to have his spleen
removed. Even though this procedure appears to have been medi-
cally necessary and competently performed, the doctor
intentionally failed to reveal a conflict of interest.
Dr. Golde's later conduct in having Moore return to Los Angeles
from Seattle over the course of a number of years was a betrayal of
a different order of magnitude. During that time, Golde mined
Moore's body for economically valuable cells while denying that
this was his real purpose for arranging these visits. Instead, while
acknowledging that Moore's bodily materials were helpful in
Golde's "strictly academic and purely scientific medical re-
search,"36 Golde insisted that taking Moore's bodily materials was
"necessary for his health and well-being" 37 and, in response to
Moore's specific inquiries, denied the cells had any "commercial or
financial value."' The Moore court does not focus on this alleged
intentional misrepresentation beyond describing it and concluding
134. The court said that "[t]his cause of action can properly be characterized either as
the breach of fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient's consent or, alterna-
tively, as the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient's
informed consent." Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
135. Id. at 520.
136. Id. at 487.
137. Id. at 486.
138. Id.
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"the allegations state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
or lack of informed consent."039 Such affirmative misconduct is an
extraordinary transgression, involving exploitation and deceit. It is
an outrageous abuse of the doctor-patient relationship that in no
way resembles the negligence claim of lack of informed consent.
Betrayal, disloyalty and taking advantage are at the heart of the
Moore allegations and merited a specific remedy for the dignitary
injury apart from, and instead of, lack of informed consent.
The non-property-based interests deserving of legal protection
that Golde's conduct jeopardized included bodily integrity, self-
determination, and the right to undivided loyalty concerning
medical treatment. The majority, however, failed to meaningfully
acknowledge these interests. For the Moore court the only harm
that deserved a legal remedy was the possibility that self-interest
might adversely affect medical treatment.140 It commented that,
" [t] he reason why a physician must disclose possible conflicts is ...
because certain personal interests may affect professional judg-
ment.''. The majority further noted that such interests may cause
the doctor to provide treatment "that offers marginal, or no, bene-
fits to the patient.
" 4
1
The majority is correct, as far as it goes. The follow-up visits that,
although "based upon the trust inherent in and by the virtue of the
physician-patient relationship," 43 appeared to have no therapeutic
value, starkly illustrate how financial gain can corrupt a profes-
sional's judgment. Had Moore been informed of the real purpose
of those visits he might have chosen not to proceed or might have
negotiated for a share in the commercial benefits. However, even if
a recommended treatment was medically necessary, a betrayal of
trust claim should still be available for disloyalty and intentional fail-
ure to provide the patient with material facts needed for making a
meaningful choice. The Moore court acknowledged this in refer-
ence to the medically necessary and competently performed
removal of Moore's spleen when they noted:
Even if the splenectomy had a therapeutic purpose, it does
not follow that Golde had no duty to disclose his additional
research and economic interests ... [T]he existence of a mo-
tivation for a medical procedure unrelated to the patient's
139. Id.
140. Id. at 483.
141. Id. at 485 n.10.
142. Id. at 484.
143. Id. at 481.
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health is a potential conflict of interest and a fact material to
the patient's decision.
144
As the majority acknowledged, a doctor's conflict of interest is a
material fact that the doctor is legally obligated to reveal. The fidu-
ciary relationship's demand of undivided loyalty is the source of
this obligation. Unfortunately, the Moore court conflated a lack of
informed consent claim-involving failure to disclose material
medical risks in breach of the physician's duty of care' 45--and a
breach of fiduciary duty claim-involving failure to disclose a con-
flict of interest in breach of the duty of undivided loyalty. Mixing
these two disparate claims left unresolved what this court required
Moore to prove before recovery would be allowed and what kind of
damages were recoverable. Justice Broussard, in concurrence, said
that all Moore should have to prove is that Golde's failure to dis-
close his conflict of interest "caused the plaintiff some type of
compensable damage." 46 But, without a legally recognized remedy
for betrayal of trust, that begged the question.
The California Supreme Court's allowance of both a claim for
lack of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty as alterna-
tive, seemingly fungible claims for the same conduct-failure to
reveal economic and research interests-highlights problems that
have plagued breach of fiduciary duty claims against doctors and
why a separate claim for betrayal of trust is needed. If the court
intended that the elements of a traditional lack of informed con-
sent claim had to be shown in order for Moore to recover for
"breach of fiduciary duty," his chances of recovery were almost nil.
It is highly improbable that Moore could have established the
essential elements of a lack of informed consent claim.4 7 First, the
removal of his spleen was medically necessary and a reasonable
person in Moore's position would likely have consented to the sur-
gery even with knowledge of Golde's financial interest. Only if, for
example, in addition to hiding his financial interest in Moore's
bodily materials, Golde had failed to inform him of a risk of blood-
144. Id. at 486.
145. This duty to inform of medical risks has been codified. See CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5326.2 (d) ("The nature, degree, duration, and probability of the side effects and
significant risks, commonly known by the medical profession...
146. Moore, 793 P.2d at 500.
147. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972). Cobbs, the case that sets out the neces-
sary elements for the negligence claim of lack of informed consent, is referred to eight times
in the course of the Moore majority's discussion of the lack of informed consent and breach
of fiduciary duty claims. This strongly suggests that Moore was expected to prove the usual
elements of the informed consent negligence claim before he could recover for breach of
fiduciary duty.
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poisoning from removal of the spleen and Moore then experi-
enced blood-poisoning, might the negligence claim of lack of
informed consent have been permitted.
When assessing the harm resulting from the seven years of active
deception following the original procedure, the concept of in-
formed consent seems nonsensical. If the treatment was not even
medically necessary and therefore was solely conducted for Golde's
financial gain, his deception simply does not fit within the realm of
negligent medical treatment. Instead it is a straightforward inten-
tional betrayal of trust for which the proposed statutory tort
provides an appropriate remedy.
Moore involves allegations that a fiduciary's intentional failure to
inform his entrustor of his economic conflict of interest injured
the entrustor's interest in undivided loyalty and corrupted the fi-
duciary's medical judgment. Golde's intentional nondisclosure of
his financial interests in Moore's cells was the means by which his
duty to Moore was breached. The patient's trust was betrayed when
the doctor failed to disclose his personal interests that were unre-
lated to Moore's medical well-being, thereby violating his rights to
bodily integrity and self-determination.
The Moore court's provision of a lack of informed consent claim
in the alternative to a breach of fiduciary duty claim added nothing
but confusion. Since the allegations concern disloyalty and self-
dealing, only one claim-betrayal of trust as a form of breach of
fiduciary duty-should have been allowed. The Moore majority's
express approval of breach of fiduciary duty as an alternative claim
should have meant that the usual causation and damages elements
of a lack of informed consent claim were not required.
While aptly describing the claim as a breach of fiduciary duty,
the Moore majority failed to expressly allow Moore to recover dam-
ages even if he were unable to show any physical injury resulted,
and even if the fact finder concluded that Moore would have con-
sented to the treatment had he been properly informed. Most
likely the court chose not to do this for fear that such a holding
could not be limited in some reasonable way. A statutory tort for
betrayal of trust that incorporates a damage cap is therefore ap-
propriate to assure that disloyalty is compensated as harm in itself.
Conduct such as that alleged in Moore calls for such a prophylac-
tic response. Money damages should be awardable in order to
deter such conduct even where no physical or severe emotional
harm results. In addition, if Moore was able to prove that Golde
planned from the start to use his cells for Golde's research and fi-
nancial interests and then lied to Moore when asked about this,
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punitive damages would be appropriate based on clear and con-
vincing evidence of subjective intentional bad faith, something that
almost never can be shown in an ordinary informed consent or
medical malpractice claim. 4
Under the proposed statute outlined above, if Moore had
proved that Golde intentionally withheld information about his
financial interest in Moore's bodily material, he could have recov-
ered for both the original deception at the time his spleen was
removed and for the later deceptions that continued over the
seven-year period before he discovered what was going on. He
could have recovered the maximum of $100,000 for the numerous
separate acts of betrayal. Possibly punitive damages would also have
been recoverable. While all this might add up to a substantial sum,
the specific statutory dollar limits keep the possible recovery from
becoming over-deterrence.
One hopes that extreme facts like those in Moore are rare. They
are not, however, unique. For example, news reports describe a
betrayal of a much greater magnitude. A fertility doctor in Califor-
nia stole one woman's egg and successfully implanted it in another
• 149
woman, who later gave birth.
There is evidence that some doctors perform unnecessary sur-
geries and prescribe unneeded medications because of financial
conflicts of interest.50 Betrayals of trust such as these deserve their
own remedy, separate from those for any other claims of injury. In
the next Section, the Illinois court refuses to recognize that the
dignitary harm resulting from betrayal of trust is separate from
medical malpractice.
2. Neade v. Portes
Perhaps the case that best illustrates the need for a limited statu-
tory tort for betrayal of trust is Neade v. Portes,151 out of Illinois. The
Neade facts illustrate a clear harm in search of a remedy and a court
that was unwilling to use its common law power to find one.
In Neade, the estate of Anthony Neade sued his doctor, Dr.
Steven Portes, and his primary care center for medical negligence
148. Justice Broussard agreed that "in appropriate circumstances, punitive ... damages
would clearly be recoverable." Moore, 793 P.2d at 500.
149. Donna Alvarado, California Egg Case Sparks Debate on Infertility Clinics, SUNDAY ORE-
GONIAN, May 28, 1995, at A17; see alsoANDREws & NELKIN, supra note 120, at 157-58.
150. GROOPNIAN, supra note 21, at 203-212, 223-233.
151. 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000).
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and breach of fiduciary duty after Neade died of heart failure. 152
Neade had classic symptoms of heart problems, including a family
history of heart disease, hypertension, and high cholesterol. He
was overweight and a heavy smoker. At age 37, he went to see Dr.
Portes because he was experiencing chest pain extending into his
arm and shortness of breath.' 54 During this initial visit, he was hos-
pitalized for three days and diagnosed with "hiatal hernia and/or
esophagitis" after Dr. Portes ran a "thallium stress test" and an elec-
trocardiogram (EKG) .15' Neade returned to his doctor complaining
of the same symptoms three times within the two months after his
hospitalization. During each of these visits, Dr. Portes informed
Neade that, based on the tests run when he was hospitalized ini-
tially, his symptoms were not cardiac-related. Neade returned again
shortly thereafter complaining of "stabbing chest pain."' 56 At that
time, Dr. Portes's associate, Dr. Huang, recommended that Neade
be given an angiogram to check for more specific coronary artery
disease than a thallium stress test provides. Dr. Portes refused to
authorize the test.'57 About eight months later, Neade presented
himself with the same symptoms. 5 Yet another doctor recom-
mended an angiogram and Dr. Portes once again refused to
authorize the test.' 5 Neade died that year after suffering a massive
heart attack.
60
Neade's estate uncovered facts relating to Dr. Portes's relation-
ship with Neade's HMO, Chicago HMO, that were not disclosed to
Neade and that indicated an economic conflict of interest.'6' Un-
der the terms of a contract between Dr. Portes, his primary care
clinic, and Chicago HMO, Neade stood to benefit financially from
a $75,000 per year "Medical Incentive Fund.' 62 The fund covered
the cost of patient referrals and outside medical tests such as the
angiogram Dr. Portes refused to authorize.' 63 The physicians at Dr.
Portes's practice divided 60% of the money remaining in the fund
at the end of each year, and if the fund was depleted before year's
end, Dr. Portes and his group of doctors would be required to fund
152. Id. at 498.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 499.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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the tests themselves.164 The contract therefore provided a powerful
financial disincentive to doctors contemplating ordering certain
tests.
Neade's estate first alleged that Dr. Portes's refusal to order an
angiogram and reliance on the thallium stress test constituted
medical negligence that proximately caused Neade's death.
65
Neade's estate also alleged that Dr. Portes breached his fiduciary
duty toward Neade by refusing to authorize further testing, by re-
fusing to refer Neade to a specialist, and by failing to disclose his
relationship with Chicago HMO. 66 The estate claimed that Portes'
contract with Chicago HMO conflicted with Neade's physical well-
being, subrogating it to Dr. Portes's financial gain.67 The trial court
held that evidence relating to the fund was irrelevant to the ques-
tion whether Dr. Portes deviated from the correct standard of care
in the medical negligence claim and that Illinois courts did not
recognize a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against a
physician. 168 The Illinois intermediate appellate court reversed the
trial court as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding that
plaintiff could proceed against defendants on both medical negli-
gence and breach of fiduciary duty.'69
The majority Illinois Supreme Court sided with the trial court by
rejecting the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Its opinion framed the
primary issue as whether Illinois plaintiffs can state a cause of ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty against doctors for failure to
disclose financial ties such as Dr. Portes's financial tie to Chicago
HMO.'7 The court held that Neade's estate would have to prove
that the medical care was substandard in both the malpractice and
the breach of fiduciary duty claims and therefore because the
claims were "duplicative," the breach of fiduciary duty claim should
not be recognized. 'w As further support for this conclusion, the
court noted that plaintiff pled that the damages for both claims
was death. 7 2 Therefore, "though [Neade's estate] attempt[ed] to
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 500.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 503. The Illinois Supreme Court did not recognize the inconsistency of its
holding with Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640 (Ct. App. Ill. 1997), an attorney sex case, where the
Illinois Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff had a valid cause of action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty against an attorney who used his position as attorney and his knowledge of his
client's dependence upon him to gain sexual favors. Id. 649-51.
172. Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 503.
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couch the claim in different terms, [it was] essentially pleading the
same cause of action which caused the same damages.""'3
In a compelling dissent, Chief Justice Harrison took the majority
to task for, in essence, barring a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against doctors when Illinois courts provide a breach of fiduciary
duty claim for clients suing lawyers.1 4 The dissent agreed that when
the same operative facts support both a negligence cause of action
and a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the fiduciary duty
claim ought to be dismissed. 75 However, he demonstrated that the
breach of fiduciary duty claim was for a different kind of wrongdo-
ing and could justifiably provide relief even where a plaintiff could
not prove that a doctor's conduct fell below the medical profes-
sion's standard of care. As he aptly explained, the breach of
fiduciary duty would be based on proving a conflict of interest, Dr.
Portes's failure to disclose the financial incentives offered by Chi-
cago HMO .
This case provides a disturbing portrait of how financial incen-
tives in the form of financial gain can potentially cloud a doctor's
judgment. The Neade decision meant that a serious betrayal would
be without a remedy even though the patient/entrustor suffered
the most egregious of harms. If the Neade estate was unable to
prove that Dr. Portes committed malpractice by his actions (for
example, by relying on the thallium stress test), then the plaintiff
would be barred from any recovery.
By failing to disclose the financial ties (and perhaps even by hav-
ing those ties at all), Dr. Portes likely betrayed his patient Neade's
trust. Our proposal would have provided Neade's estate with a
statutory claim for betrayal of trust that would not have faced the
same "duplicative" scrutiny by the Illinois Supreme Court because
it is a stand-alone claim requiring the estate to set forth clear and
convincing evidence of disloyalty regardless of whether other harm
is proved. Dr. Portes's act of placing his financial interest ahead of
the medical well-being of Neade would be enough-the estate
would not have to prove that Dr. Portes's behavior fell below the
standard of care. Of course, if the estate could meet its burden in
173. Id.
174. Id. at 506 (Harrison,J., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. Id. ("It is conceivable that a trier of fact could find both that Dr. Portes was within
the standard of care and therefore not negligent in relying on the thallium stress test and
the EKG in deciding that an angiogram was not necessary and also that Dr. Portes did
breach his fiduciary duty in not disclosing his financial incentive arrangement and, as a
proximate result thereof, Neade did not obtain a second opinion, suffered a massive coro-
nary infarction, and died.") (quoting appellate court decision).
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the malpractice claim, it could recover an additional damage
amount for that as well.
B. Resolving Common Law Inconsistencies
Courts have not only struggled to apply existing legal theories to
betrayals, but as demonstrated above, they have also applied legal
standards inconsistently, leading to lopsided results. In the Perl line
of cases and in D.A.B. v. Brown, discussed below, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court came to very different results when considering
betrayals of trust made by a lawyer and a doctor. Our proposed tort
would have given the Minnesota court a uniform approach for
dealing with both professionals.
1. Lawyers' Divided Loyalty: The Perl Trilogy
This Section examines a series of cases involving divided loyalties
and conflicts of interest where the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cludes that clients can sue lawyers for breach of fiduciary duty
without proof of pecuniary or other traditional forms of harm. The
Minnesota court therefore approves of something akin to the pro-
posed betrayal of trust claim, at least for lawyer disloyalty. In this
respect, Minnesota has taken the lead on such common law claims
with a trilogy of cases involving the same lawyer and the same con-
flict of interest: Rice v. Perl ' (Perl 1); Perl v. St. Paul and Marine Ins.
Co.'1 8 (perl I); and Gilchrist v. Perl"79 (Perl III).
In the next Section, however, this string of cases involving a law-
yer is contrasted with the Minnesota Court of Appeals' conclusion,
ten years later, that a pediatrician's acceptance of substantial kick-
backs in exchange for prescribing an expensive and powerful drug
to children was not a compensable breach of fiduciary duty, inde-
pendent of medical malpractice. The different outcomes are
indefensible but typical. Perhaps that is because the kinds of harm
doctors and lawyers cause are usually quite different. Injuries to
patients are usually physical; when attorneys harm their clients, the
harm is often economic.
177. Perl I, 320 N.W.2d at 407.
178. Perl II, 345 N.W.2d at 209.
179. 387 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1986).
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For attorney breach of fiduciary duty cases involving economic
harm,' ° such claims are usually subsumed under another tort, most
notably fraud. 18 In some jurisdictions, courts have also allowed full
or partial forfeiture of the attorney's fees where a conflict of inter-
est existed, even if no "actual harm" beyond the betrayal itself was
proved. 8 2 Although malpractice damages for attorney betrayals are
different than malpractice damages for betrayal by doctors, each
betrayal deserves a unifying statutory remedy.
In the Minnesota lawyer cases, Norman Perl represented more
than one hundred women 18 in their claims for injuries caused by
A. H. Robbins' notorious Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company was Robbins' insurer. 85 The
Aetna claims adjuster with whom Perl negotiated these Dalkon
Shield claims was Willard Browne. At the same time that Perl,
representing plaintiffs, negotiated settlements with Browne, repre-
senting Robbins' insurance company, Perl also employed Browne.
In addition, Browne was Perl's personal friend.8  The Minnesota
Supreme Court noted:
It is undisputed that from 1976 through 1979, Browne was si-
multaneously employed and paid as a claims adjuster by Aetna
and by the Perl firm on a part-time basis. Therefore, during
the same period of time that Browne was supposed to be vig-
orously representing Aetna in [the] Dalkon Shield claims ...
180. See, e.g., Millbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994) (in-
volving a lawyer's conflict of interest causing substantial economic harm); Goldman v. Kane,
329 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (involving lawyer overreaching client in business
transaction).
181. See, e.g., Ball v. Posey, 222 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Blackey v. Alexander,
195 N.W. 455, 456 (Minn. 1923); Anderson v. Anderson, 197 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1972).
Since fraud is an intentional tort that requires actual harm, typically any damages that would
be recoverable under a common law breach of fiduciary duty claim are already recoverable
under fraud including punitive damages.
Of course, some attorney betrayals do result in physical harm or incarceration. For exam-
ple, in Barbara A. v. John G., the California courts applied fraud to a case where an attorney
intentionally misrepresented his fertility to a family-law client and then impregnated her,
resulting in an ectopic pregnancy. 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
182. See, e.g., Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Eriks v. Denver, 824
P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. S. Ct. 1992).
183. Per III, 387 N.W.2d at 419.
184. See MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD (Pantheon Books 1985); RICHARD SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
185. Pert I, 320 N.W.2d at 408.
186. Id. at 408.
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he was receiving payments from the Perl firm, an adversary as
to those claims.
87
In this situation, Perl clearly breached his fiduciary duty by not
informing his clients of this conflict of interest.188
Perl and Browne settled the Dalkon Shield claims. The plaintiff
in Perl I, Cecelia Rice, accepted $50,000; the cases do not reveal
what the other women received. There was no allegation that any
of the women were dissatisfied with their settlement amounts;
however, there was evidence of client dissatisfaction with amount of
the attorney fee.
89
When Rice found out about Browne's relationship to Perl, she
sued Perl for fraud, legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty.
After Rice prevailed on her breach of fiduciary duty claim, a class
action by other similarly situated former clients was brought for
breach of fiduciary duty.'90 In Perl III the court allowed members of
that class to seek fee forfeiture against Perl as well.
In Perl I, the issue was whether Perl's breach of fiduciary dutyjus-
tified requiring him to forfeit his entire attorney's fee where there
was no "actual injury."' 9' The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded
that "an attorney ... who breaches his duty to his client forfeits his
right to compensation."'' 92 "[T]hese consequences follow even
though the [client], ignorant of the duplicitous agency, cannot
prove actual injury to himself or that the agent committed an in-
tentional fraud.' 93 Perl II addressed the question of whether Perl's
malpractice insurer was obligated to cover the cost of Perl's for-
feited attorney's fees. The court concluded that while the policy
did cover this, for public policy reasons the malpractice insurance
company should not be required to pay. 94 Finally, Perl IXaddressed
187. Id.
188. Browne's employment with Perl's firm was not routine and his role was subject to
dispute by the parties. Perl claimed Browne was a consultant who prepared medical files for
the firm's specialty, FELA cases; plaintiffs claimed that "Browne and Perl were engaged in a
secret scheme to settle Dalkon Shield cases en masse." Id. at 409 n.2.
189. Rice disputed the amount of Perl's contingency fee at the time she settled with A.
H. Robbins. She claimed that the printed figure of 33.3 percent was what she owed Perl
while he claimed it was the 50 percent that was handwritten over the printed figure. Perl
received 50 percent but Rice then sued Perl over the fee. She settled that claim for $5000.
Id. at 408, n.1.
190. Perl 1I1, 387 N.W.2d 412 (1986).
191. Perl 1, 320 N.W.2d at 411. The term "actual injury" would include traditional inju-
ries for which compensatory damages are allowed: physical injury, economic loss, and
emotional harm.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 197 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1972)).
194. While Perl's malpractice insurance company was not required to cover Perl's fee
forfeiture, it was required to cover the same fee forfeiture for Perrs law firm that was liable
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the question of whether less than full fee forfeiture could be
awarded when there are multiple claims. The court, analogizing to
punitive damage awards, found the punitive aspect of the forfei-
ture remedy sometimes made partial rather than total forfeiture
appropriate.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis in the three Perl deci-
sions contributes to understanding the rationales for our proposed
betrayal of trust claim. It highlights the importance of recognizing
the betrayal of trust itself as an injury worthy of its own separate
legal remedy. As in Moore, disloyalty, not incompetence, was al-
leged. While negligence "in the air" does not justify a remedy,
disloyalty, even without financial loss or physical injury, sometimes
does.
The conduct of attorney Perl in the Perl cases, although blatantly
inappropriate, was not necessarily detrimental to Perl's clients. An
attorney's close friendship with and employment of the opposing
side's negotiator may be more detrimental to the opposing side
than to the clients. The fact that none of the 100-plus clients
claimed they were dissatisfied with their settlements suggests that
Perl's disloyalty did not harm their economic interests. Even when
describing the kinds of actual injuries Perl's clients were at risk of
suffering, the court was unconvincing. All it could suggest in the
way of potential harm was that "[i]f Aetna later rescinded the
agreement, [the client's] reputation might suffer simply from hav-
ing been a party, albeit an innocent party, to this arrangement." 
9
5
In the Perl cases, there was no physical or economic injury and
the risk of financial harm was small. Nevertheless, the court re-
quired attorney Perl to forfeit his fee because he was disloyal. The
court found that disloyalty itself was an injury the law should rem-
edy. In Perl I the court noted that an "attorney is under a duty to
represent the client with undivided loyalty, to preserve the client's
confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing upon the
representation of these obligations."1 96 The importance of loyalty to
the outcome in these cases was further highlighted in Perl I. In
justifying the fee forfeiture, despite the lack of pecuniary or other
"actual damages," the court described attorney loyalty as "a kind of
along with Perl under respondeat superior. The court noted, however, that Perl might still
end up bearing the loss because the insurance company could seek indemnification from
Perl for its payment of the fee on behalf of the law firm. Per II, 345 N.W. 2d at 214-17. But
see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Perl, 415 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. S. Ct. 1987) (indemnifica-
tion agreement between attorney and his law firm extinguished insurer's subrogation rights
for claims paid as a result of attorney's breach of fiduciary duty).
195. PerlI, 320 N.W.2d at 411.
196. Id. at 410 (emphasis omitted) (quoting R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE § 121, at 208 (2nd. ed. 1981)).
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'absolute' right. ,197 If this right is violated "the client is deemed in-
jured even if no actual loss results."'" 8 The court compared the
remedy of fee forfeiture for disloyalty to other tort claims that enti-
tle a plaintiff to damages, regardless of the lack of a financial,
physical or emotional injury.199
The Perl II court made clear that the fee forfeiture awarded to
Rice in Perl I was not restitution but instead was compensation for
an injury. 20 0 The court described the injury as "the client's justifi-
able perception that.., she has or may have received less than the
honest advice and zealous performance to which a client is enti-
tled."20 1 They later added that the aim of fee forfeiture for breach
of fiduciary duty is "to make amends to the client-to 'put right'
the attorney-client relationship that has been tainted."20 2 Thus, the
court asserted that loyalty itself is a legally protected interest and
that disloyalty is a compensable injury.
The Perl II court went on to point out that deterrence and pun-
ishment also justify awards for breaches of fiduciary duty without
proof of pecuniary harm. The court noted: "The fee forfeiture
serves to provide the injured client with a remedy, but it also has
the effect of punishing the attorney for the breach of fiduciary
duty and deterring further lapses in professional conduct."
2 0 3
In Perl III, the court discussed the "subtle, dual nature of the fee
forfeiture remedy, with its punitive and nonpunitive aspects,"
which it described as "reparational and admonitory., 20 4 In reaching
the conclusion that in some cases partial rather than complete fee
197. Pert II, 345 N.W.2d at 212.
198. Id. at 212.
199. Id. The court cited cases involving damages for dissection of plaintiffs deceased
husband's body and for trespass to land. Certain intentional torts, such as offensive battery
and false imprisonment, where the harm compensated is often purely dignitary, are other
prime examples. DOBBS, supra note 106, at 281 (2d Ed. 1993). See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104
NW. 12 (Minn. 1905) (awarding more than $14,000 for medical battery); Blume v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 963 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (awarding $25,000 compensatory damages for
15 to 20 minutes wrongful detention). See also Tamar Lewin, Ignoring 'Right to Die'Directives,
Medical Community Is BeingSued, N.Y. TIMES,June 2,1996, § 1, at 1.
While the Perl H court described such damage awards as "nominal" large dollar amounts
are often involved. Juries have awarded substantial damages in false imprisonment and of-
fensive battery cases where the harm was the indignity or offense itself. Similarly, forfeiture
of attorney fees can involve a large amount of money. Thus, when Perl II concluded that
partial forfeiture of the fees for the 100-plus plaintiffs was appropriate, the term "nominal"
most likely did not accurately describe the aggregate amount of such forfeiture.
200. Per II, 345 N.W.2d at 212-13. The court explained that "[a] sum usually equiva-
lent to the fee is awarded to the client, not to restore the client to any status quo because of
any, unjust enrichment, but because the client has been injured."
201. Id. at 213.
202. Id. at 214.
203. Id.
204. Pert II1, 387 N.W.2d at 416.
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forfeiture is the appropriate remedy the court concluded, "the
predominant functions of any fee forfeiture are punishment and
deterrence. '20 5 This conclusion was used to distinguish Perl I from
Perl III. In the former, complete fee forfeiture was awarded to one
plaintiff, whereas in the latter, for the identical breach of fiduciary
duty, only partial forfeiture was to be awarded to a class of plain-
tiffs.
The Perl trilogy is representative of how one jurisdiction treats
claims of attorney breach of fiduciary duty involving disloyalty or
dishonesty.26 Fee forfeiture is viewed as both compensating the cli-
ent for the attorney's disloyalty and punishing the lawyer for this
betrayal of trust; the disloyalty itself is a legally recognizable injury.
The importance of maintaining the integrity of the professional
fiduciary relationship supports this response to fiduciary disloyalty.
The Minnesota courts' treatment of the breach of fiduciary duty
claim in the attorney cases was correct and should apply equally to
physicians and other professionals who betray their entrustors'
trust. When loyalty is betrayed through self-dealing, regardless of
proof of other harm, there is an injury to the professional relation-
ship that should be compensable. If a jurisdiction consistently
provided the fee forfeiture remedy for this form of betrayal of
trust, a statutory tort would not be necessary. Unfortunately, as set
forth in the next section, the Minnesota Court of Appeals took a
different approach when assessing a doctor's egregious betrayal.
2. Doctors' Divided Loyalty: D.A.B. v. Brown
Doctors, like lawyers, are fiduciaries. They are expected to place
their patients' interests ahead of their own when providing them
with medical treatment or advice.0 7 Yet, regardless of how outra-
geous the betrayal, courts often refuse to provide a remedy for the
breach of this fiduciary duty. A few, like the Moore majority, feign
concern that "certain personal interests may affect professional
205. Id.
206. A few other jurisdictions have responded similarly. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999); see also Errin Martin, Comments, The Line Has Been Drawn on the
Attorney-Client Relationship: The Implications of Burrow v. Arce to Texas Practitioners, 32 TEx. TECH.
L. REV. 391 (2001).
207. "A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as
paramount." Ami. MED. ASs'N, PRINCI.ES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Principle VIII (adopted by
the AMA's House of Delegates, June 17, 2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/category/2512.html.
208. See Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493 (Ariz. 1978); Spoor v. Serota, 852 P.2d 1292
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Neades v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000); Garcia v. Coffman, 946
P.2d 216 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
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judgment"209 but leave the status quo intact. However, most courts
do not even pretend to recognize that a doctor's self-dealing and
disloyalties are harms, independent of competence-based medical
malpractice, for which patients can seek a remedy. A stark example
is the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, D.A.B. v. Brown.2 0
D.A.B. involved allegations of egregious self-dealing and disloy-
alty by the defendant doctor. David Brown, a pediatric
endocrinologist, was sued by six of his minor patients and their
parents for having accepted kickbacks for prescribing the powerful
growth hormone drug, Protropin. 21 According to news reports,
Brown was federally prosecuted for receiving over one million dol-
lars in kickbacks from the drug's manufacturer and distributor.212
The appellate court in D.A.B. noted that a federal jury convicted
213him of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Over an eight-year period, Brown prescribed Protropin for more
than 200 of his child patients whom he diagnosed as having hor-
monal deficiencies that made them abnormally short. The cost of
this treatment ranged from $20,000 to $30,000 per patient per
year. The kickbacks gave Brown a strong personal economic incen-
tive to prescribe Protropin to as many patients as possible. This is
exactly the kind of problem the majority in Moore recognized when
they noted that a financial conflict of interest could cause a doctor
to provide treatment "that offers marginal, or no, benefits to the
patient., 214 Regarding Protropin, medical experts were already
"concerned that children who have a normal amount of human
growth hormone and no medical problems but are simply short
209. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,485 n.10 (Cal. 1990).
210. 570 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. Minn. 1997). The plaintiffs did not seek review of the
decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
211. Kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies to physicians are a serious problem. See
generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTER-
EST 57-67, 98-100 (1993); ErickaJonietz, Of Doctors, Drugs and Trust, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW,
November 16, 2004, http://www.techreview.com/articles/04/11/wojonietzI 11604.asp (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009). See also supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
Anti-Kickback Statute).
212. Gina Kolata, Selling Growth Drug for Children: The Legal and Ethical Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, August 15, 1994, at Al.
The arrangement between Brown and the producer of Protropin was anything but subtle:
[A] Caremark employee sent a memo... stating that Dr. Brown would receive 5 per-
cent of revenues from the Protropin he prescribed and calculating that he was owed,
at that time, $101,551. Dr. Brown wrote a letter... saying he wanted to make sales of
$2.3 million for 1987 and $1.35 million for 1986 the "bases for our program."
Id.
213. D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 169. Brown was granted a new trial "because [he] was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury." Id.
214. Moore, 793 P.2d at 484.
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are being given the drug despite a lack of convincing evidence that
it increases their final adult height. 215 Nationally, Brown was one of
the doctors who prescribed Protropin most frequently.
216
Brown's former patients and their parents tried to bring a class
action suit for breach of fiduciary duty. This was a situation where
the conflict of interest itself-the acceptance of kickbacks-was the
sole injury for which they sought recovery. Thus, relying on the Perl
decisions, they sued for money damages even though they did not
allege that the drug caused the children any physical harm.217 The
trial judge dismissed their claim because of this failure to allege
any injury beyond the misconduct itself. The court of appeals af-
firmed this dismissal, finding that breach of fiduciary duty in this
case was substantively identical to the malpractice claim of lack of
informed consent that required proof of physical injury.
The appellate court found "the gravamen of the complaint
sounds in medical malpractice"2 's and "the essence of the allega-
tions21 9 to be "a classic informed consent issue" involving the "duty
to disclose.2 ° In support of this conclusion, they cited Minnesota's
leading lack of informed consent decision.2 2 ' That case involved
failure to disclose a material risk of death;222 D.A.B. involved illegal
financial benefits from prescribing a prescription drug. It is very
hard to see the connection.
The D.A.B. court's finding that failure to disclose the acceptance
of kickbacks was a "classic informed consent issue" indicates that
loyalty was not viewed as a distinct aspect of the doctor-patient
relationship, separate from the right to receive adequate
information about the risks surrounding and alternatives to a
particular medical procedure. Instead it was treated as merely a
risk that arose out of a medical procedure.
215. Kolata, supra note 212. A BBC report notes that in England more than one fifth of
children receiving synthetic human growth hormone treatment are "given it for unlicensed
reasons such as short stature with no obvious cause." BBC News, Concern Over Growth Drug
Use, Mar. 21, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1885064.stm (last visited Feb. 20,
2009).
216. Kolata, supra note 212.
217. D.A.B., 570 N.W. 2d at 172. Unlike the Pert cases, ordinary money damages rather
than fee forfeiture were sought. This is not surprising since doctors' fees are often covered
by medical insurance or Medicaid. In order to provide a remedy for the doctor's disloyalty as
an injury, money damages payable to the patients to compensate for and punish that disloy-
alty were appropriate.
218. D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 171.
219. Id. at 170.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 171 (citing Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977)).
222. Cornfelt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977).
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The criminal self-dealing involved in the acceptance of kick-
backs in no way resembles the negligent failure to inform of a risk
that might result from a medical procedure. Kickbacks involve tak-
ing advantage of a patient for unlawful economic gain. Failure to
inform of a risk from a surgery is about failure to meet the stan-
dard of care for competent medical treatment. It is senseless to
assert that there was a duty to inform patients of acceptance of
kickbacks. Informing his patients would not have cured this fla-
grant breach of fiduciary duty. Not accepting the kickbacks in the
first place was the only way for this defendant to avoid breaching
this duty and betraying his patients' trust.
Conflicts of interests and self-dealing in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship such as those in D.A.B. have recently received increased
scrutiny.23 Particularly, some worry that doctors who receive kick-
backs from drug manufacturers, in one form or another, will put
their wallet before a patient's best interests. Legal scholars have
suggested requiring informed consent as an appropriate remedy
2 24
However, where there is a clear betrayal of trust, D.A.B. demon-
strates the inadequacy of that remedy.
The Minnesota Court set forth certain rationales for its conclu-
sion that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for accepting
kickbacks is a subset of traditional lack of informed consent. All of
the rationales are equally problematic. First, the court simply con-
cluded that any injury or misconduct that involved "examining,
diagnosing, treating, or caring" for patients is by definition medical
malpractice, subject to this claim's substantive and procedural re-
quirements, including proof of physical harm.225 It seems patently
absurd to assert that all conduct involving medical treatment must
be treated as a form of negligence-based medical malpractice. If
the Minnesota court really meant this, medical batteries without
physical harm would not be recognized as a separate claim either.
Yet Minnesota continues to recognize the venerable medical bat-TT*7• 226
tery case of Mohr v. Williams, in which a doctor was found liable
for competently operating on one diseased ear when he had only
received consent to operate on the other ear.227 In Mohr liability was
based solely on the dignitary injury that occurs any time there is
223. See; Alex Berenson & Andrew Pollack, Doctors Reap Millions for Anemia Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2007, at Al; Harris, Carey & Roberts, supra note 20; Gardiner Harris & Janet
Roberts, Doctors' Ties to Drug Makers are Put on Close View, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at Al.
224. Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions
and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 967 (2007).
225. D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 172.
226. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
227. Mohr is cited with approval in Minnesota's leading lack of informed consent deci-
sion, Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977).
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nonconsensual offensive touching rather than any physical harm
or malpractice.
The second and more persuasive rationale given by the court for
denying a separate claim for breach of fiduciary duty/betrayal of
trust is the slippery-slope argument. The court darkly warned that
allowing an independent claim for breach of fiduciary duty where
kickbacks have been accepted would "permit avoidance of every
statute defining the physician/patient relationship."228 Raising the
ante, the court continues: "Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any
medical malpractice claim that would not be pleaded as a breach
of fiduciary duty claim in order to bypass legislative procedures
aimed at implementing the common law."2 29 Certainly the same
could be said concerning breach of fiduciary duty and legal mal-
practice. Yet the Perl decisions have not resulted in an avalanche of
breach of fiduciary duty claims against lawyers because there are
obvious distinctions courts can draw between cases involving legal
incompetence and cases involving disloyalty. A statutory tort for
betrayal of trust makes these distinctions even clearer.
In cases such as D.A.B., where neither incompetence nor harm
beyond the disloyalty itself is alleged, fear of unlimited compensa-
tory damages makes the statutory tort of betrayal of trust especially
appealing. Under the facts of D.A.B. the maximum compensatory
damages to the class would be $500,000. Punitive damages could
still be permitted if the disloyal conduct was sufficiently egregious.
Some situations involving physician disloyalty and kickbacks
might merit additional damages for physical injury. For example, if
one of Brown's patient's had suffered a harmful side effect from
Protropin which Brown failed to inform the patient about, a claim
for traditional lack of informed consent might have been brought.
If the patient could prove that a reasonable person, knowing of the
risk of this side effect, would not have taken Protropin, the patient
could recover for the harm suffered. Even if the patient could also
establish that the doctor was accepting kickbacks, thereby betray-
ing his trust, compensatory damages for that conduct would be
limited to the statutory maximum. Punitive damages might also be
available.
228. D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 171.
229. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
To date, most appellate courts that have addressed whether to al-
low a claim for betrayal of trust in the form of breach of fiduciary
duty in settings where betrayal has caused dignitary rather than
purely economic harm have refused to do so. While a few courts
have attempted to bend existing common law breach of fiduciary
duty claims to fit varied factual contexts where the essential harm is
not financial, most courts have found various excuses not to do so.
Disturbingly, however, in areas of legal practice such as family
law, personal injury practice, and criminal defense work, the most
serious injuries to betrayed entrustors are frequently non-
economic. Similarly, in the medical setting, the harm to patients
caused by betrayal will usually be dignitary and will often (but not
always) be accompanied by physical or emotional rather than
purely economic harm. Because of the inapplicability of remedies
such as malpractice, lack of informed consent, and breach of fidu-
ciary duty where the harm is solely to an entrustor's dignitary
interests, and because of the failure to adequately compensate
when both dignitary and other harm is involved, legislatures
should enact a statutory remedy for betrayal in order to give the
entrustors a legal remedy for this distinctive and important harm.
Such a remedy would serve the dual purposes of deterring future
betrayals and providing justice by compensating betrayed entrus-
tors.
While not all betrayals and conflicts of interest are as glaring as
Moore, the dignitary harm from betrayal still deserves a remedy. We
have demonstrated that the remedies currently available to those
who have been harmed by a fiduciary are simply inadequate.
Rather than expecting courts to bend the existing remedies to fit
betrayals of trust, the legislature should provide a limited monetary
remedy, along the lines of the proposed statutory tort set forth
above. In such situations, a limited monetary remedy, set forth by
statute, is one way to at least partially make the entrustor whole
again. Adopting the proposed statutory tort of betrayal of trust
would enable courts to provide such compensation while alleviat-
ing their concerns about turning every medical negligence claim
into a breach of fiduciary claim, thereby risking double recovery
and runaway juries.
The need for a limited statutory remedy grows more compelling
every day. Doctors accepting illegal kickbacks and extravagant gifts
from the pharmaceutical industry or investing in the medical tech-
nology they then recommend to their patients are one target.
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Lawyers betraying the trust of clients by conditioning legal services
on sexual favors or putting their own financial interest ahead of
the physical freedom of their clients is another. Legislatures should
enact our proposed statute in order to provide justice for those
harmed by fiduciaries who have a mandate to be loyal and who be-
tray their entrustors. Otherwise, victims of fiduciary disloyalty will
continue to be left with no legal recourse. This grave injustice cries
out for a remedy, for a tort of betrayal of trust.
i
